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THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
EXPLORING THE MYTHS BEHIND ATTACKS
ON THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
Scott M Martin*
I. INTRODUCTION
For as long as there have been copyrights, debate has raged over
the appropriate term of protection.' Many view the current U.S. and
European duration of protection-life of the author plus seventy
years-as the appropriate term; others view the prior term of life plus
fifty years as better reasoned. At one extreme of the debate, some
argue that the ownership of copyright interests should be the same as
2
for tangible property: perpetuity. At the other extreme, some argue
for a term of protection as short as ten years.
3
* Senior Vice-President for Intellectual Property and Associate General
Counsel, Paramount Pictures Corporation. Former Adjunct Professor of Copy-
right Law, USC School of Law, Associate in Law, Columbia University
School of Law; and Guest Lecturer, USC Thornton School of Music. The
views expressed in this Article are strictly my own and do not necessarily rep-
resent the views or opinions of Paramount Pictures.
1. The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 begins its discussion of
the term of protection by noting: "The debate over how long a copyright
should last is as old as the oldest copyright statute and will doubtless continue
as long as there is a copyright law." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5749.
2. Congressman Sonny Bono thought that ownership of copyright should
be like ownership of a house: it should last for perpetuity. See, e.g., 144
CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (1998) (statement of Mary Bono that "Sonny [Bono]
wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever."). Mark Twain ex-
pressed similar feelings: "[Y]ou might just as well, after you had discovered a
coal-mine and worked it twenty-eight years, have the Government step in and
take it away. .. ." Arguments Before the Committees on Patents on S. 6330
and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 116 (1906) (statement of Samuel L. Clemens, au-
thor) [hereinafter Patent Arguments]. "I am aware that copyright must have a
limit, because that is required by the Constitution of the United States...
When I appeared before [a] committee of the House of Lords the chairman
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Those who believe that the term of protection should be less
than life plus seventy years failed to persuade Congress to adopt their
views. Recently, they moved their battle to the courts and the news
media in an effort to have their personal views of the appropriate
term adopted as U.S. law. Such efforts would at first appear futile,
since Congress, not litigation in the courts, is the appropriate forum
for establishing the statutory term of copyright protection.4 However
the proponents of the various alternative terms of protection, primar-
ily academics, dreamed up a range of creative arguments for attack-
ing the constitutionality of Congress's selection of the current term
of protection. Those arguments are based in large part on a series of
popular myths about copyright law which do not bear up to analyti-
cal scrutiny, even though some have been repeated so often that they
have taken on lives of their own.
The dictionary defines a myth as "an unfounded or false no-
tion... having only an imaginary or unverifiable existence."5 That
definition fits most, if not all, of the arguments asserted in support of
the notion that the courts, rather than Congress, should determine the
appropriate duration of the term of copyright protection in the United
States.
asked me what limit I would propose. I said, 'Perpetuity."' SAMUEL CLEM-
ENS, Copyright, in MARK TWAIN'S SPEECHES 323, 324-27 (1910). Jack
Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America, suggested that the term should be "forever less one day." 144
CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (1998) (statement of Mary Bono summarizing Jack
Valenti's position).
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 252-53 (2001) (arguing for a term of pro-
tection for computer programs of five years, renewable once). Professor Les-
sig also proposed that the term of copyright protection for other works should
be a five-year term that could be renewed for up to an additional seventy-five
years. See id. at 251-52; see also Stephen Shankland, Open-source Advocate
Attacks Patent Laws, ZDNET NEWS (Aug. 30, 2001) at http://news.
zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2094103,00.html (reporting on a keynote address by
Lawrence Lessig urging open-source software programmers and advocates to
lobby for "strong but short copyright protection").
4. The general grant of power that precedes the Copyright Clause, which
is the basis for most of the challenges to the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, clearly states: "Congress shall have the power.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. Not courts. Congress. The Congress is empowered to grant limited time
monopolies. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 770 (Frederick C.
Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 2002).
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Unfortunately, truth has taken a back seat-or, more often than
not, been completely left behind-in the efforts by those opposed to
the current term of copyright protection to convince the media and
the courts that Congress acted without legal authority.
The philosophy behind many of the attacks on congressional ex-
tensions of the term of copyright protection begins with a myth
which is crucial to all anti-copyright arguments: copyright good,
public domain better. This Article will examine this unsubstantiated
myth plus nine other oft-repeated myths which are used to attack the
validity, the constitutionality, and the public policy behind congres-
sional extensions of the term of protection for copyrights in the
United States.
Myth #1: Congress ran rampant by granting term extensions,
enacting eleven extensions in just forty years, and must be stopped
by the courts.
Myth #2: Copyright good, public domain better.
Myth #3: The recent addition of twenty years to the term of
copyright protection in the United States was a bad policy choice by
Congress that the courts must reverse.
Myth #4: Extensions of the term of copyright protection for ex-
isting works cannot possibly promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.
Myth #5: Congress lacks the authority to add twenty years to
the term of copyright protection.
Myth #6: Extensions of the term of copyright protection are an
affront to, and an impingement on, First Amendment rights.
Myth #7: The Myth of the Holy Internet: the arrival of the Inter-
net changes everything.
Myth #8: The term of copyright protection in the United States
is a matter only of U.S. law and has no international ramifications.
Myth #9: Judicial nullification of retroactive extensions of the
term of copyright protection would be no big deal.
Myth #10: The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 was the worst kind of special-interest legislation engineered by
Disney to satisfy its insatiable corporate greed.
On the list of "Eternal Questions Which Have No Answer," the
question "What is the correct duration for copyright protection?" is
second only to "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?"
There is no empirical way to answer these questions, and anyone
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who claims to have an empirical answer is, in reality, merely advo-
cating their personal perspective. This Article will not suggest what
the appropriate term of copyright should be, it will merely refute the
arguments that Congress's determination that the appropriate term is
life of the author plus seventy years was unconstitutional. This Arti-
cle is thus limited to an examination of the reasons why there is no
legal basis for a court to substitute its own view, or the views of any
private parties, for the views of Congress on the issue of the appro-
priate duration of copyright protection.
6
II. BACKGROUND TO THE RECENT LEGAL AND MEDIA ATTACKS ON
THE CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSIONS OF THE TERM OF PROTECTION OF
COPYRIGHTS
In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act (CTEA),7 which added twenty years of protection to all
copyrighted works. The additional term of protection applies to
works that received statutory copyright protection under the 1909
Copyright Act,8 to works previously protected by common law copy-
right to which the 1976 Act9 for the first time conferred statutory
protection, and to works created during the pendency of the 1976
Act. It applies equally to works of domestic and foreign origin.
For works created prior to January 1, 1978, the term of protec-
tion was extended from seventy-five years to ninety-five years,
commencing on the earlier of first publication or registration with the
Copyright Office.' 0 For works created by individuals on or after
January 1, 1978, the term of protection was extended from life of the
author plus fifty years to life plus seventy years." And for works-
6. The question of whether Congress did a wise thing is a very different
question from whether Congress did an illegal thing when it added twenty
years to the term of copyright protection. Highly respected copyright authori-
ties, such as Professor Jane Ginsburg of Columbia University School of Law,
have expressed the view that term extension was a bad idea, but is nonetheless
not unconstitutional. See Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 701-
04 (2000) [hereinafter Symposium].
7. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extention Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
8. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
9. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000).
11. See id. § 302(a).
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for-hire after that date, the term was extended from seventy-five
years to ninety-five years, commencing on the date on which the
work was created.
12
The primary factor' 3 behind Congress's decision to extend the
term of protection for copyrights was the implementation by the
European Union of a Directive harmonizing the term of copyright
protection for all E.U. Member States at life of the author plus sev-
enty years, 14 and requiring all E.U. Member States to deny copyright
protection to works of U.S. origin and works originating in other
non-E.U. countries that entered the public domain in their country of
origin, even though similar works of E.U. origin would still enjoy
years of copyright protection. '
5
Among the voices that urged Congress not to extend the dura-
tion of the term of copyright protection were publishers of public
domain works, libraries, archivists, and Internet activists. When
Congress decided that the advantages of term extension outweighed
the disadvantages, the opponents of term extension launched a
12. This same term of protection also applies to anonymous works and
pseudonymous works. See id. § 302(c) (2000).
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (statement of the Commit-
tee of the Judiciary noting that, upon enactment of the extension, "U.S. works
will generally be protected for the same amount of time as works created by
the European Union authors. Therefore, the United States will ensure that
profits generated from the sale of U.S. intellectual property abroad will come
back to the United States."); see also The Copyright Term Extension Act of
1995: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (statement of Senator Feinstein noting that
"[p]erhaps the most compelling reason for this legislation is the need for
greater international harmonization of copyright terms.") [hereinafter CTEA
Hearings].
14. The Directive provides, in section 11, that "the term of protection for
copyright should be harmonized at 70 years after the death of the author or 70
years after the work is lawfully made available to the public .... " Council
Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection
of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 11, 24 [hereinafter
Term Directive].
15. Section 23 of the Directive provides that "where a right holder who is
not a Community national qualifies for protection under an international
agreement [such as the Berne Convention] the term of protection of related
rights should be the same as that laid down in this Directive, except that is
should not exceed that fixed in the country of which the rightholder is a na-
tional." Id. Member States were required to implement the Term Directive by
July 1, 1995. See id. art. 13.
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litigation effort to have their view of the appropriate term imposed
over Congress's views.
Backed by the free legal services of a group of law professors,
Eric Eldred, the owner of an online service which distributes public
domain works, launched a constitutional challenge to the validity of
the CTEA. 16 Since the courts cannot merely substitute their view of
the appropriate term of protection for the legislated view of Con-
gress, the challenge focused on two constitutional arguments: (i) the
extension of the term of protection is an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment; and (ii) the application of the extended term to
already-existing works is an unconstitutional violation of the limita-
tions imposed by the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
17
The District Court rejected the challenge,' 8 as did the Circuit
Court. 19 The Supreme Court granted Eldred's petition for certio-
•20
rari.
With that preamble behind us, let the myth dismantling com-
mence.
16. Since 1995, Eric Eldred has been the editor at Eldritch Press, a pub-
lisher of public domain books on the Internet, including the complete works of
Nathaniel Hawthorne. A number of other plaintiffs joined the lawsuit, includ-
ing the American Film Heritage Association (a non-profit film preservation
group that represents film preservationists), Dover Publications, Inc. (a book
publisher specializing in reprinting public domain works), Moviecraft, Inc. (a
commercial film archive), and Copyright's Commons (a non-profit organiza-
tion operated out of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet and
Society).
17. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) (ruling that the
CTEA does not violate the constitutional requirement that authors receive ex-
clusive rights to their creations for only a limited time).
19. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 255 F.3d 849 (2001) (affirming the district court in a 2-1 decision,
holding that the twenty-year extension of the term of copyright protection was
neither contrary to the Copyright Clause nor to the First Amendment).
20. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
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III. MYTH #1: "CONGRESS RAN RAMPANT BY GRANTING TERM
EXTENSIONS, ENACTING ELEVEN EXTENSIONS IN JUST FORTY YEARS,
AND MUST BE STOPPED BY THE COURTS"
Congress is on a rampage and must be stopped!2' Or so the
myth goes. This myth forms the core of petitioners' argument that
the term of copyright is no longer a "limited term," as required by the
Copyright Clause: "Under the recent practice of Congress-
extending the terms of existing copyrights eleven times in the past
forty years--copyright terms are no longer 'limited.' ... The conse-
quence is that no author or artist can rely upon work passing into the
public domain."22 This myth is, perhaps, the easiest to refute be-
cause it is unequivocally untrue. Not only has Congress changed the
approach to the duration only twice in the past forty years (not eleven
times as asserted in virtually every attack on term extension), Con-
gress has, at the same time, significantly shortened the duration of
copyright protection for large categories of works.
A. The Effective Duration of Copyright Protection Was Increased
Twice, Not Eleven Times, Over the Past Forty Years
According to myth, Congress relentlessly extended the term of
copyright eleven times in just forty years, and, unless the courts in-
tercede, the "copyright dictators" 23 will continue to successfully
pressure Congress into extending the term countless times in the fu-
ture.2 4
21. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive et al. in Support of Peti-
tioners at 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Internet Archive Brief]
("There is no reason to believe [the CTEA] will be the last. Rather, it is far
more likely that Congress will be pressured in 2018 to add still more term to
works whose copyrights would otherwise expire.").
22. Brief for Petitioners at 18, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter
Petitioners Brief].
23. Dan Gillmor, Copyright Dictators Winning Out, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Feb. 20, 2002, at IC (borrowing a turn of phrase from a columnist in
the San Jose Mercury News).
24. Lawrence Lessig told the Boston Globe: "In all of the 19th century,
Congress changed the term of copyright only once. In the first half of the 20th
century, they changed it once again. In the 38 years that I have been alive,
they have changed it 11 times. It's one thing when courts are deferential to a
well-behaved Congress. If Congress can change so much, why shouldn't the
courts?" Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 29,
1999, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-
29/featurestoryl.shtml. Eldred's petition for a writ of certiorari states:
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In fact, Congress revised its view of the appropriate duration of
copyright protection only twice in the past forty years: once in the
1976 Copyright Act-which changed the term from an initial term of
twenty-eight years plus a renewal term to a term of life of the author
plus fifty years (with a commensurate increase in the term of protec-
tion for existing works); and then again in the 1998 CTEA-which
added twenty years of additional protection to all existing terms of
copyright. The other nine extensions were short interim extensions
passed during the deliberation over the 1976 Act in order to ensure
that authors of works on the cusp of falling into the public domain
would not be penalized by Congress's glacial pace in enacting the
new Copyright Act.
The 1909 Act provided for an original and a renewal term of
statutory copyright totaling fifty-six years. 25 Congress changed this
in the 1976 Act, effective January 1, 1978, to a term of life plus fifty
years for new works.26 Congress did not apply the new term to exist-
ing works, but it did add nineteen years to the term of protection for
existing works which were not yet in the public domain.27 Congress
began actively working on the new Copyright Act in 1962, but it
took fourteen years to reach agreement on all the details of the new
Act. Ironically, the term of protection to be applied by the new Act
was one of the least contentious provisions of the new law. Since the
provisions of the new Act did not apply to works which entered the
public domain prior to the effective date of the Act, Congress pro-
vided for a series of nine short interim extensions of copyright pend-
ing final enactment of the new law.
28
"Congress has adopted a practice that defeats the Framers' plan by creating in
practice an unlimited term." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Eldred v. Reno,
239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Petition for Writ].
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) ("Duration of copyright: Works created on
or after January 1, 1978").
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) ("Duration of copyright: Subsisting copy-
rights"). The 1976 Act also brought unpublished works, which were previ-
ously covered only by common law copyright, under the term of protection of
the Copyright Act. See id. § 303 ("Duration of copyright: Works created but
not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978").
28. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (continuing
the interim extension up to the December 31, 1976, date on which the new Act
applied to works not yet in the public domain); Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181 (continuing the interim extension for the years 1973
and 1974); Act of Nov. 24, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (continuing
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The congressional intent behind the interim extensions was
clear: Congress felt that it would be inequitable to deny the benefit
of the extended copyright term to works on the cusp of entering the
public domain solely because of the long delays in the legislative
process.
29
The need for nine successive short-term extensions can be traced
directly to the fact that no one expected the process of enacting the
new Act would take years to complete. Indeed, in 1968, in support
of the third interim extension, the Register of Copyrights told Con-
gress:
I confidently expect that general revision will be enacted
in 1968. Since no real issue on the extension of term was
raised in the Senate, the duration provisions as passed by
the House in April will, I believe, be incorporated in the
the interim extension for the year 1972); Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
555, 84 Stat. 1441 (continuing the interim extension for the year 1971); Act of
Dec. 16, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 (continuing the interim exten-
sion for the year 1970); Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397
(continuing the interim extension for the year 1969); Act of Nov. 16, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (continuing the interim extension for the year
1968); Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (continuing the
interim extension for a further two years: 1966-1967); Act of Sept. 19, 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (extending the term of protection for an in-
terim period of three years: 1962-1965).
29. In support of the 1962 extension, which extended the term of protection
to December 31, 1965, the Report of the House Judiciary Committee stated:
Although it is not possible to revive expired terms of copyright, it
seems to the committee to be desirable to suspend further expiration of
copyright for a period long enough to enable the working out of re-
maining obstacles to the overall revision of the copyright law, but not
so long that it will impair the incentive of interested parties to reach a
workable agreement.
8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 8, §
A, at 8-5 (2002) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. Similar motivation
was expressed in connection with each of the successive extensions. For ex-
ample, in support of the 1965 extension, the Report of the House Judiciary
Committee indicated:
Although this legislation is now receiving consideration in both
Houses, it is doubtful that a new law can be enacted before the expira-
tion of the temporary extension. In these circumstances it seems de-
sirable that the terms of expiring copyrights should be extended so that
the copyright holders may enjoy the benefit of any increase in term
that may be enacted by the Congress.
Id., app. 8, § B, at 8-20.
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new revision statute.30  The poignant irony of copyrights
that have already been extended in anticipation of revision
being allowed to fall into the public domain only a few
months short of their goal is too obvious to require elabora-
tion. If achievement of general revision were not so close I
might have some misgivings about going back to the well a
third time, but as things now stand I believe that failure to
give expiring renewal copyrights 1 more year would be
most unfortunate. 31
As it turned out, it took ten more years before the new Act was
passed and took effect. During those ten years, the term of protec-
tion ultimately included in the new Act was never in dispute.
Characterizations of these short-term interim extensions, all of
which were a part of the single congressional effort to enact a revised
Copyright Act, as unrelated extensions of the term of protection, or
as a recidivist congressional pattern of endlessly extending the dura-
tion of copyright are either uninformed or intellectually dishonest.
Indeed, the petitioner's request for writ of certiorari takes this
intellectual dishonesty to the next level by arguing that the nine in-
terim extensions (without ever acknowledging their status as interim
extensions) were part of a congressional plot to avoid the "limited
term" restriction of the Copyright Clause by repeatedly enacting one
or two-year extensions to the term of protection. 32 Nowhere, in text
or footnote, does the petitioner's brief disclose that Congress de-
cided, as early as the 1960s, to shift to a term of life of the author
plus fifty years, with a commensurate term for existing works, and
that each of those brief extensions was expressly designed to avoid
penalizing authors whose copyrights would have been lost during
delays in enactment of the new Copyright Act-delays which had
nothing to do with disputes over the new term of protection.
30. This term was for the life of the author plus fifty years.
31. Statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights, reprinted
in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 29, app. 8, § C, at 8-31.
32. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 22, at 2 ("Congress now regularly es-
capes the restriction of 'limited Times' [referring to the "limited term" wording
of the Copyright Clause] by repeatedly extending the terms of existing copy-
rights-eleven times in the past forty years. These blanket extensions were
initially short (one or two years). In 1976, the extension was for nineteen
years.").
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Regardless of one's perspective on the wisdom of congressional
thinking in extending the term of copyright protection to life plus
fifty years and then to life plus seventy years, it is important to ac-
knowledge that the portrayal of an out-of-control Congress cease-
lessly extending the duration of statutory protection-creating "a
perpetual [copyright] term 'on the installment plan"' 33 -is nothing
more than an uneducated myth.
B. Over the Past Forty Years Congress Has Significantly Shortened
the Duration of Copyright Protection for Large Classes of Works
In the process of enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
dramatically shortened the duration of copyright protection for
enormous classes of works-a fact completely ignored by those who
want the courts to impose their personal view of the appropriate term
of copyright protection, and a fact which refutes the claim that Con-
gress is dismantling the public domain.
34
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act, unpublished works were
protected by common law copyright, rather than by statutory copy-
right. The duration of protection for common law copyright was
perpetuity. 35 As a result, unpublished works-including unpublished
novels, short stories, songs, early drafts of published works, letters,
and any other material which the author did not distribute to the gen-
eral public-never entered the public domain.
36
Congress cut short these perpetual terms of protection during the
1970s through two different pieces of legislation:
9 In 1972, sound recordings were brought under the scope of
federal statutory copyright protection for the first time.37 For
sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, the duration of
copyright protection is now the same as for all other types of
33. Id. at 18.
34. Seeid. at3.
35. The perpetual protection accorded under common law copyright did not
violate the limited term requirement of the Copyright Clause because that
protection did not arise from any congressional enactment.
36. If it seemed outrageous that Sonny Bono and Mark Twain argued that
the term of copyright should be perpetual (see Clemens, supra note 2), it
should be kept in mind that prior to January 1, 1978, all unpublished works
created by Mr. Bono or Mr. Twain were in fact accorded protection in perpetu-
ity.
37. See The Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat.
391 (1971).
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works-and following the expiration of that newly limited term
of protection, the recordings will enter the public domain.
38
Sound recordings that were fixed prior to that date are not cov-
ered by federal statutory copyright law and continue to be pro-
tected by common law copyright or other state law protection.39
o Effective on January 1, 1978, Congress provided that all un-
published works that were not then covered by copyright protec-
tion would be covered by federal copyright law.40 Previously all
unpublished works enjoyed perpetual protection and never en-
tered the public domain unless the work was registered with the
U.S. Copyright Office; now all of those works will enter the
public domain upon expiration of the term of federal copyright
protection.
When Congress extended the term of protection to life of the au-
thor plus fifty years in the 1976 Copyright Act, it justified that exten-
sion in part on the reduction in the duration of protection for unpub-
lished works, noting that a "statutory term of life-plus-50 years is no
more than a fair recompense for the loss of these perpetual rights.'
Since ten of the eleven extensions of the term of protection for
copyrights during the past forty years were part of a single compre-
hensive congressional adjustment of all terms of copyright-which
included a dramatic reduction in the term of protection for a large
class of works-a judicial nullification of any aspect of that term ex-
tension (such as a denial of extensions of protection for existing
38. See id. § 3 (for the first time sound recordings were accorded statutory
copyright, provided that it "shall take effect four months after its enactment
... ." The Act was passed by Congress on October 15, 1971, and became ef-
fective on February 15, 1972).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000) (scope of exclusive rights in sound re-
cordings); id. § 101 (definitions).
40. See id. § 303. This statute provides:
Duration of copyright: Works created but not published or copyrighted
before January 1, 1978:
(a) Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not there-
tofore in the public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1,
1978, and endures for the term provided by section 302. In no case,
however, shall the term of copyright in such a work expire before De-
cember 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or before December
31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire before December 31,
2047.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135 (1976).
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works) without a linked restoration of perpetual protection for un-
published works would be a miscarriage of justice. Opponents of
congressional decisions regarding the appropriate term of copyright
protection have ignored this balance and thus pretended that facts
that fail to support their myths simply do not exist.
42
IV. MYTH #2: "COPYRIGHT GOOD, PUBLIC DOMAIN BETTER"
In George Orwell's classic Animal Farm, the sheep, in an effort
to persuade the other animals that the pigs are superior leaders, chant
the slogan: "Four legs good, two legs better!" In a similar effort to
divert attention from reality, opponents of the CTEA seem to have
adopted the slogan: "Copyright good, public domain better! "
No one denies the value of the public domain; no one denies the
value of copyright. But among the opponents of term extension there
has been a tendency to misstate the impact of term extension on the
public domain and to rely on slogans and myths in attempting to ele-
vate the value of the public domain over the value of copyrights.
In order to accurately assess both the appropriate place in time
where the line should be drawn between copyright protection and the
public domain, and whether Congress grievously and constitutionally
erred in drawing that line, it is important to strip away the myths and
misinformation about the value of the public domain relative to the
value of copyrights. Once those myths are stripped away, it becomes
clear that Congress did not act without reason when it added twenty
years to the term of copyright protection.
A. Chicken Little's Decline and Fall of the Public Domain
The death of the public domain has been greatly exaggerated.
The amici curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court by a group of
libraries and archivists argues that Congress has "transform[ed] a
limited monopoly into a virtually limitless one."43 One law professor
42. If one accepts the argument that Congress lacks the authority to extend
the term of protection, it must similarly lack the authority to shorten the term
of protection, since a shortened duration is, if anything, a disincentive for au-
thors to continue creating new works.
43. Brief Amici Curiae American Association of Law Libraries et al. in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618
[hereinafter Libraries Brief].
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sowed the seeds of confusion by telling the press that "[f]or the first
time in our history, almost nothing is entering the public domain.
4 4
This is obvious nonsense. As discussed above, Congress created
two classes of works which will enter the public domain during the
coming years-works which previously would have enjoyed perpet-
ual protection. When Congress twice recalculated and extended the
term of copyright protection, it removed large classes of works from
perpetual protection. This significant shortening of copyright protec-
tion, and ultimate addition to the public domain, is no where re-
flected in the arguments of the anti-copyright advocates. Unpub-
lished works and sound recordings, which until the 1970s never en-
tered the public domain, will now become a part of the public do-
main. Indeed, those works will continue to enter the public domain
during the twenty-year period following the enactment of the CTEA.
The 1976 Copyright Act provides that all unpublished works created
prior to January 1, 1978, will enter the public domain on January 1,
2003, and that date remains unaffected by the CTEA. 45 There will be
a twenty-year hiatus during which works previously protected by
copyright law will be delayed in entering the public domain. Those
have not been accorded perpetual protection and will still enter the
public domain when their term expires.
The briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in support of the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Eldred proclaim the demise of the
public domain at the hands of Congress without any factual basis and
without acknowledging that in the same era that the term of protec-
tion increased, the term of protection for unpublished works and
44. Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/
magazine/8-29/featurestoryl .shtml (quoting Arizona State University Law Pro-
fessor Dennis Karjala's website). Professor Karjala's website proclaims: "For
the first time in over 200 years of copyright history in the United States, this
legislation means that NO WORKS WILL ENTER THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
FOR A FULL 20 YEARS!" Dennis Karjala, About Copyright Term Extension,
at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
what.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
45. Section 303 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides: "Copyright in a work
created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or
copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for the term provided
by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of copyright in such a work
expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or before
December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire before December
31, 2047." 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). The CTEA did not extend the effective
public domain date of January 1, 2003.
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sound recordings significantly decreased. Typical of this misinfor-
mation is the brief filed by a group of library and archive interests,
which includes the following chart purporting to show congressional
strangulation of the public domain.46 The chart is, unfortunately, a
work of misleading graphic creativity rather than a work of factual
information:
The Growth Rate of the Public Domain
* Public Domain If Unrestrained by Term Extension
* Public Domain hindered by Copyright Extensions
*
14 4 19 20
yeon Y-m VMS
1790 1831 1909 1962-1976 1998
The chart relies on three falsehoods in order to perpetuate the
myth that Congress is dismantling the public domain. First, while
visually dramatic, there is no logic to the vertical grid. Second, the
chart implies that the size of public domain is decreasing when in
fact all works published prior to 1922 are now in the public do-
main-thus the two-thirds of the chart which covers the period from
1790 through 1922 should be entirely shaded dark to reflect the
scope of works now in the public domain. And third, the chart de-
nies the single most significant increases in the public domain in the
history of the United States by ignoring the fact that, for the first time
ever, unpublished works and sound recordings will be entering the
public domain--dramatically increasing the growth rate of the public
domain. Far from strangling or dismantling the public domain dur-
ing the years in which Congress stands accused of relentlessly
46. Libraries Brief, supra note 43, at 21.
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expanding the term of copyright protection, Congress dramatically
increased the scope of the public domain.
Regardless of personal views on the appropriate duration of pro-
tection, the fact that Congress increased the term of protection for
certain works while reducing protection for other works demon-
strates that Congress attempted to balance the policy concerns and
did not single-mindedly gut the public domain.
B. Limitations Inherent in the Scope of Copyright Protection
An important element often overlooked by those who argue that
the courts must expedite the rate at which copyrighted works enter
the public domain are the limitations inherent in copyright which al-
low the creation of new works inspired by copyrighted works. Aside
from the defense of fair use-that allowed an author to create the
novel "The Wind Done Gone," based on "Gone With The Wind, ,
47
and allowed the rap group 2 Live Crew to create the song "Big Hairy
Woman" based on Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman" 4--copyright
protection is limited to expression and accords no protection for
ideas. 49 The myth is that works are not available for use by the pub-
lic unless they are in the public domain; the truth is that the works
are available and the ideas are free for the taking.
Those who hope to have their views of the appropriate term of
protection replace the term selected by Congress treat copyright law
as though it provides a monopoly over ideas. Typical of the intellec-
tually irresponsible scare tactics used in this debate is the promulga-
tion of the myth that, had the present term of copyright been in effect
in the nineteenth century, Santa Claus himself would have been pro-
tected by copyright until 1973.50 This amusing, but baseless, myth
47. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1 1th Cir.
2001).
48. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
49. This fundamental concept of copyright law, long recognized by the
courts, was expressly codified for the first time in the 1976 Copyright Act: "In
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such a work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
50. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 44, at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/what.html ("[U]nder the
proposed copyright extension his rights to both Santa Claus and Uncle Sam
would have continued until 1973!"); see also Gillmor, supra note 23, at IC
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springs from the assertion that if Thomas Nast's classic drawings for
Harper's magazine (1860 through 1888) were still protected by copy-
right, "we may never have seen the development that we now take
for granted-and Nast's descendants might be seeking royalties from
everyone seeking to put out Christmas decorations."
51
The fallacies of this myth begin with the fact that, even if copy-
right law still protected those drawings, the copyright would protect
only the drawings. Nast did not invent St. Nick (or St. Nicholas) or
Santa Claus. The name Santa Claus has been traced back as far as
1773, while settlers brought the Duge legend of Sinter Klaas to New
York in the seventeenth century. And the idea of a fat bearded jolly
persona of Santa is merely that: an unprotectable idea. Indeed,
many of the traits which we associate with Santa can be traced not to
Nast's drawing but further back in time to Washington Irving's 1809
description of St. Nick (which included the phrase "lays his finger
aside of his nose") and to Clement Clarke Moore's classic 1823
poem "A Visit From Saint Nicholas,'" more commonly known as
"The Night Before Christmas."
Thus, contrary to myth, Nast never held a copyright on the idea,
persona, likeness, or name of Santa Claus, and his heirs would never
have a basis for "seeking royalties from everyone seeking to put out
Christmas decorations."
Other intellectually dishonest myths include claims that Uncle
Sam would have been subject to copyright until 1973, based on the
Thomas Nast drawing;52 that the Democratic and Republican parties
would not be able to use the donkey or the elephant as their
("Anyone using the image of Santa Claus as a fat man with a beard and red suit
would have had to pay royalties during much of the last century if the [CTEA]
had been in effect when a cartoonist dreamed up that caricature in the 1880s.");
Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-
29/featurestoryl.shtml ("Were Nast's creations under [CTEA]-style copy-
right.., every department store [would have to pay Nast's heirs] come
Christmas time.").
51. Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property
Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 "The Copy-
right Term Extension Act," Submitted to the Committees on the Judiciary,
United States Senate and United States House of Representatives, Jan. 28,
1999.
52. See id; see also Fonda, supra note 24, available at
http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-29/featurestoryl.shtml (last visited
Aug. 12, 2002) ("Were Nast's creations under [CTEA]-style copyright...
[m]ore than likely, Uncle Sam wouldn't be the symbol of the country.").
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symbols; 53 and that, but for the public domain, rights to the Easter
Bunny would be locked up. 54 In fact, the name and image of "Uncle
Sam," and its patriotic associations, long predated Nast's drawing
55
and there is no evidence offered that the Easter Bunny was ever pro-
tected by copyright.
Copyright provides no monopoly over ideas-indeed it provides
absolutely no protection for ideas. The 1976 Copyright Act ex-
pressly provides that "in no case does copyright protection ... ex-
tend to any idea .... 56 Yet the provisions of the fair use clause of
the Copyright Act even limit the monopoly that is accorded to origi-
nal expression.57 Indeed, the Supreme Court made it clear on at least
53. This canard appears in an article by Daren Fonda. See Fonda, supra
note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-
29/featurestoryl.shtml. Based on the fact that Thomas Nast also did drawings
of the Democratic donkey and the Republican elephant, the reporter drew the
false conclusion that "both political parties would have had to pay fees" when-
ever they used one of those animals. In fact, the Democratic donkey dates
back to 1828, when it was associated with Democrat Andrew Jackson's presi-
dential campaign. His opponents called him a jackass (a donkey), and Jackson
responded by using the image of the strong-willed animal on his campaign
posters. The donkey soon became associated with all Democratic candidates.
The Republican elephant did indeed originate with Nast, in 1877. After the
Republicans lost the White House to the Democrats in that year, Nast drew a
cartoon of an elephant walking into a trap set by a donkey. He reportedly
chose the elephant to represent the Republicans because elephants are intelli-
gent but easily controlled. As noted above, however, only Nast's drawing of
the elephant, which was unflattering to Republicans and is not used by the Re-
publican party, would be protected, not the idea of using an elephant as the
symbol of the party.
54. See Karjala, supra note 44, at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/what.html.
55. The origins of "Uncle Sam" date back to the War of 1812, during which
Samuel Wilson, popularly known as Uncle Sam, operated a slaughter house in
Troy, N.Y. He supplied barrels of beef to the soldiers, stamping the barrels
"U.S." for "Uncle Sam's." Soldiers who received the beef began using the ap-
pellation "Uncle Sam" figuratively for the United States. This interpretation
was picked up by other soldiers who began to call everything belonging to the
government "Uncle Sam's." The term, as applied to the United States, quickly
sprang into popular favor and the weekly periodicals soon began to use carica-
ture likeness of Uncle Sam, with a long white beard and high hat, as the repre-
sentation of the government in Washington.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). See footnote 49 for the full text of this pro-
vision.
57. The fair use clause of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
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two occasions that "[t]he fair use doctrine. . . 'permits [and requires]
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is de-
signed to foster.'
' 58
The limitations inherent in the scope of copyright protection be-
came increasingly clear over the past several years, gutting the myth
that a work must enter the public domain before it can provide a ba-
sis for a new creative work. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
the Supreme Court clearly established that works of parody, like
other works of comment or criticism, are entitled to benefits of the
fair use provision. 59 In ruling that copyright law permitted a retelling
of Gone With the Wind from the perspective of the slaves on the
plantation, the Eleventh Circuit stressed the "constitutional signifi-
cance [of the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act] as a guarantor
to access and use for First Amendment purposes." 60 Contrary to mis-
leading myths, the limits inherent within the very nature of copyright
protection, particularly the limitations that copyright does not protect
ideas and the fair use exemption, ensure that the movement of works
into public domain need not be expedited in order to prevent copy-
right owners from limiting access to existing works or preventing the
creation of new works. 61 These facts, ignored by the anti-copyright
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. § 107.
58. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
59. See id. at 579-80.
60. SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260 n.3.
61. Even where an icon is protected by copyright, it does not follow that the
copyright owner can prevent non-infringing uses of that icon. A prime
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advocates, demonstrate that the policy arrived at by Congress in the
CTEA was not without merit or reason.
C. Copyright Encourages, While the Public Domain Discourages,
Progress in the Arts
At the risk of speaking words of heresy, it is copyright protec-
tion that encourages innovation and creativity, while the public do-
main discourages both innovation and creativity.
Why create something new if you can reprint or reuse something
that already exists? Why invest in untested new works if you can
instead distribute royalty-free existing works?
The fact that creators of new works cannot merely re-use the ex-
pression contained in copyrighted work of others without permission
forces them to be creative. Composers cannot rehash the melodies
created by earlier composers, they must create their own new origi-
nal melodies. Writers must invent new characters and plots instead
of recycling the efforts of others. Animators and motion picture stu-
dios cannot freeload on Mickey Mouse; copyright protection forces
them to create their own original cartoon characters. This promotion
of fresh creation is an entirely appropriate goal for Congress to pur-
sue through legislation.
Counter to the "copyright good, public domain better" myth, an
extension of the term of copyright protection at the temporary ex-
pense of the public domain encourages rather than discourages the
creation of fresh new original works. Opponents of the current dura-
tion of protection argue that an earlier termination of copyright pro-
tection would encourage the copyright owner to create new works
rather than relying on income from old works. 62 While such a result
may ensue from earlier loss of copyright protection, if creation of
example is the song "Happy Birthday"--the lyrics to which are still protected
by copyright in the United States (owned by Warner Chapel). Yet the song is
still sung at virtually every birthday celebration without restrictions or imposi-
tion of liability.
62. For example, an NYU law professor argued, "[I]f entertainment compa-
nies like Disney want more money, they should develop new and more won-
derful characters .... That's what we really want them to be doing with their
fear that Mickey is going into the public domain." Alex Berenson, Disney's
Copyright Conundrum, THESTREET.COM (May 8, 1998), at
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/topstories/14933.html (quoting Professor Ro-
chelle Dreyfuss).
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fresh works is a policy goal for copyright law, is it not better to cre-
ate incentives for all creators to develop new works in lieu of free-
loading on existing works than it is to encourage just one party-the
copyright owner-to develop new works?
Another myth argues that the public is automatically better
served when a work is in the public domain than it is when a work is
protected by copyright. An example is the classic motion picture,
It's a Wonderful Life. The film entered the public domain at the end
of its first term of copyright protection because the copyright owner
failed to file a timely renewal application. Opponents of the CTEA
use this film as a prime example of the merits of the public domain:
"Had we been operating then under our current system, this classic
film would still be gathering dust (and literally rotting away) on stu-
dio shelves. This is one of the clearest and most dramatic examples
of the value of the public domain." 63 The truth is quite the opposite.
Because Republic Picture, and its successor Spelling Entertain-
ment, still own the exclusive motion picture rights to the underlying
short story and to the music-neither of which is in the public do-
main-no one can create or exhibit copies of It's a Wonderful Life
without the permission of Spelling. After years of neglect, Spelling
began to assert copyright control over the film based on these under-
lying rights. Spelling subsequently granted exclusive home video
rights to a distributor and exclusive television broadcast rights to
NBC. 64
Before Republic and Spelling began enforcing their claim to the
underlying rights in the film, local stations and cable channels look-
ing for no-cost programming broadcast the film endlessly, with the
result that, "to put it politely, the film's currency was being deval-
ued.",65 By the 1980s, there were multiple versions of the film, all in
horrid condition. 66 The film was "often sliced and diced by local sta-
tions who stuffed it with commercials." 67 There was no quality
63. Dennis Karjala, Value of the Public Domain, at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
publicdomain.html (last visited July 28, 2002).
64. See It's NBC's "Wonderful Life ", ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Dec. 5, 1994.
65. Bill Carter, Where Have You Gone, Tyrone Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1994, at D10.
66. See Two Days of Christmas Classics, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 24, 2000.
67. Larry Bonko, "Wonderful Life" Has Become a TV Treasure, VIRGIN-
IAN-PILOT, Dec. 24, 1999, at El.
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control over home video copies of the film-consumers had no way
of knowing whether the tape they were purchasing was a poor qual-
ity bootleg version (which most were).6 After the exclusive broad-
cast rights for the film were licensed to NBC, the film was spruced
up and restored to the sharp, crisp production made by Capra in
1946, when Jimmy Stewart was just a few months out of his military
service. 69 The press hailed the restored version: "The films, beauti-
fully restored, offer delights almost lost to the screen .... I can hon-
estly say I haven't enjoyed going to the movies so much in years."
70
The restoration of the film would not have taken place had Republic
and Spelling not been able to recapture their investment through the
exercise of exclusive distribution rights to the film.
When the underlying rights to the film were not being enforced,
It's A Wonderful Life was an orphan of the public domain, exploited
without regard to quality, ravaged and uncared for. Only after the
copyrights in the underlying rights were enforced was anyone willing
to spend the money necessary to restore and preserve the film. Con-
trary to the myth that It's A Wonderful Life is "one of the clearest
and most dramatic examples of the value of the public domain,', 7 1 the
film is, in fact, one of the clearest and most dramatic examples of the
limitations of the public domain and the value of copyright protec-
tion.
It is a myth that expediting the movement of works like It's a
Wonderful Life into the public domain prevents such works from
gathering dust. Even if the myth were true, not everyone would
agree that the public was better served when It's a Wonderful Life
was treated as being in the public domain. And, as noted later in this
Article, 72 efforts to preserve, restore, and bring motion pictures up to
current levels of technological and consumer expectations can take
years and cost tens of thousands of dollars. The necessary time and
68. The Chairman of Republic Pictures, Russell Goldsmith, was quoted as
saying that one of his goals in enforcing copyright claims to the underlying
rights in the picture was to eliminate "bootleg copies and poor quality copies of
the film." James Bates, Putting the Brakes on a Christmas Classic, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 25, 1993, at 1OC.
69. See Bonko, supra note 67, at El.
70. Stephen Hunter, Auteur of Corn: A Film Retrospective Explores the
Dark Side of Frank Capra's Sunny World, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1998, at DO 1.
71. Karjala, supra note 63, at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/
Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/publicdomain.html.
72. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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money is not allocated to that effort except when films continue to
enjoy many years of copyright protection.
Regardless of whether one is more persuaded by the argument
that an extension of copyright protection promotes progress in the
arts or by the argument that moving works more quickly into the
public domain promotes such progress, the mere existence of those
two points of view demonstrates that there is no empirical way to
determine the appropriate term of protection. Rather, that determina-
tion is a policy matter requiring a balancing of interests. Whether
one agrees or disagrees with the balance arrived at by Congress, that
decision cannot accurately be portrayed as an abuse of congressional
authority.
D. The Realities of the Global Market Place
Later in this Article, I will discuss the international implications
of copyright term extension.73 However, in response to the inflated
value of the public domain portrayed by opponents of term exten-
sion, it is important to note that the exploitation of works is increas-
ingly undertaken on a global, rather than a territorial basis. As a re-
sult, expediting the movement of U.S. works into the public domain
at a earlier time than they would enter the public domain in Europe
contributes little to the scope of works which can be freely exploited
on a worldwide basis.
In her testimony to Congress in support of the CTEA, the Regis-
ter of Copyrights noted that the "development of the global informa-
tion infrastructure" means that "copyrighted works now may be
transmitted, virtually instantly, almost anywhere in the world. 74
The Internet is the most obvious example of this phenomenon.
A U.S.-based website can be viewed anywhere in the world. A less
obvious, but equally important example, is the growth of foreign
markets for U.S. audiovisual works. The value of foreign revenue
has grown to such an extent that no motion picture studio will pro-
duce a feature film unless the film can also be distributed outside the
United States; few studios would produce a television production
unless they could, at the very least, also be exploited in Canada.
73. See discussion infra Parts X, V.B. (comparing the international terms of
copyright protection), V.C. (discussing the congressional goal of harmoniza-
tion of U.S. law with international copyright norms).
74. CTEA Hearings, supra note 13, at 7 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
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This international reach of copyrighted works means that most
audiovisual works will not be created unless they can be distributed
in the United States and beyond. Websites which contain copy-
righted material must similarly make certain that their content does
not infringe the copyright laws of other territories.
One result of the advent of distribution without frontiers is that a
work must be in the public domain not just in the United States, but
also in key foreign territories in order to be exploited without obliga-
tions to the copyright owner. 75 As a result, pushing works into the
public domain in the U.S. at an earlier date than they do abroad pro-
vides little benefit for audiovisual works and other works which need
international distribution in order to recoup the cost of their creation.
Example: H.G. Wells' classic novel The War of the Worlds en-
tered the public domain in the United States but is still protected by
copyright in most foreign territories. 76 If someone wishes to repro-
duce the novel on a website, distribute it electronically outside the
United States, or use it as the basis for a motion picture or television
production, rights must be obtained from the owner of the copyright
outside the United States.77
With the European Community adopting the new standard of
life of the author plus seventy years as the accepted duration of copy-
right protection, if a court invalidated the CTEA, it would have little
practical impact on the exploitation of works that are in the public
domain in the United States but which are still protected by copy-
right in other key territories.
75. Another result of the advent of distribution without borders is the need
for harmonization of copyrights laws. See discussion infra Part V.C.
76. The War of the Worlds was published in 1898, and entered the public
domain in the United States in 1954. Wells died in 1946, so in all countries
which apply a duration of protection of life of the author plus seventy years,
his work continues to be protected until 2016: sixty-two years of additional
protection. The same result applies to Wells's The Island of Dr. Moreau, The
Invisible Man, and The Time Machine-all of which have been in the public
domain in the United States for decades but all of which are still protected by
copyright until 2016 in countries which apply the life-plus-70-years term of
protection.
77. For other examples of works that are in the public domain in the United
States but still protected outside the United States, see the discussion of the
works of Claude Monet and Antoine de Saint-Exupdry infra Part V.B.2.
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E. Congress Directly Addressed the Concerns of Libraries and
Archives in the CTEA, Providing Those Parties With a Specific
Exemption
The myth that the CTEA is a work of undiluted corporate greed,
enacted without regard to the public good, ignores the fact that Con-
gress took into consideration the concerns of libraries, which may
have anticipated having the right to make free use of works for which
the lapse of copyright protection was imminent. This myth is dis-
proved on its face by the provisions of the CTEA which grant librar-
ies and archives exemptions from copyright owners' exclusive rights
during the last twenty years of any term of copyright protection.
78
In particular, qualifying libraries "may reproduce, distribute,
display, or perform in facsimile or digital form a copy or phonore-
cord of such work, or portions thereof," for a list of specified pur-
poses. 79 Those purposes include "preservation, scholarship, and re-
search.",
80
This exemption is intended to allow the preservation and use of
orphaned materials that might otherwise be lost or unavailable, rather
than to give free rides. As a result, the library or archive must de-
termine, before taking advantage of this exemption and on the basis
of a reasonable investigation, that three circumstances do not apply:
81
First, it must determine that the work is not subject to normal com-
mercial exploitation.82 Second, it must determine that a copy or
phonorecord of the work cannot be obtained at a reasonable price.
83
And third, the exemption is lost if either the copyright owner or its
agent provides notice pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Register of Copyrights that either of the first two conditions apply.
84
These exemptions from copyright owners' exclusive rights dur-
ing the twenty-year extended term of protection are in addition to the
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(1) (2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. § 108(h)(2).
82. See id. § 108(h)(2)(A).
83. See id. § 108(h)(2)(B). It should be noted that the limitation on the
price that can be charged by the copyright owner acts as a form of low-cost
compulsory licensing.
84. See id. § 108(h)(2)(C).
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limitations provided by the Copyright Act on the exclusive rights of
all copyrights owners for the benefit of libraries and archives. N
The petition for certiorari and the amici briefs urging the Su-
preme Court to override the judgment of Congress in enacting the
CTEA ignore this crucial aspect of the law. The amicus brief filed
on behalf of a group of library and archive interests falsely claims
that the CTEA "prevents the timely preservation of works, deprives
scholars of research materials, and reduces funds from educational
institutions, thus hampering the preservation and dissemination of
information, stories, and documentation of who we are as a peo-
ple."86 The brief makes only a passing footnote reference to the ex-
emption provisions of the CTEA which vitiate their cries for urgent
judicial relief.
87
The other amicus briefs filed in support of Eldred's petition for a
writ of certiorari make not a single reference to this crucial aspect of
the CTEA.88 The petitioner, in his initial petition and his reply brief,
85. See id. § 108(a)-(f).
86. Libraries Brief, supra note 43, at 3.
87. In a stray footnote, the authors of the Libraries Brief concede that
"Amici are well aware that the CTEA provides an exemption in § 108(h) of
Title 17 U.S.C. (Copyright Act) for librarians and archivists to have access to a
limited group of works within the last twenty years of a work's copyright pro-
tection term. However, use of the exemption requires compliance with various
conditions." Libraries Brief, supra note 43, at 12 n.37. In a surprising bout of
honesty, the drafters of the brief do not even attempt to argue that those condi-
tions are onerous or that they in any way defeat the valuable rights granted dur-
ing the added term of copyright protection to libraries and archives at the ex-
pense of copyright owners.
88. See Internet Archive Brief, supra note 21; Brief of Intellectual Property
Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
No. 01-618 [hereinafter Intellectual Property Professors Brief]; Brief of Amici
Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund and the Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, No. 01-618; Brief of Jack M. Balkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of the Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (Constitutional Law
Professors Brief). The amicus brief filed by Michael Agee and Hal Roach Stu-
dios argues that the CTEA creates uncertainty because it "can be practically
impossible to identify successors in interest, or to trace every possible transfer
and assignment of copyright over more than seventy-five years." Brief of Hal
Roach Studios & Michael Agee as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16-
17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Hal Roach Brief]. While this
is certainly true in some cases, twenty years of personal experience in research-
ing chain of title documentation for motion pictures has shown this statement
to be the rare exception and not the rule. That same brief makes the
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pretends that this exemption does not exist in his efforts to persuade
the court that Congress acted irrationally when it enacted the
CTEA.8 9
The myth that the CTEA paralyzes libraries and archives in their
efforts to conduct preservation, scholarship, and research, and that
Congress is therefore an enemy of the public domain that must be
stopped by the courts, fades away when exposed to the exemptions
carved out from the term extension by the CTEA. No doubt this is
the reason that every party arguing to the Supreme Court that certio-
rari should be granted pretended that those exemptions do not exist.
F. The Benefits of the Public Domain Flow to Publishers Rather
Than Authors
While it has been argued that the CTEA was nothing more than
"corporate welfare" which benefits publishers at the expense of indi-
viduals, 90 it was Mark Twain who pointed out that, when a work en-
ters the public domain, publishers continue to profit from exploita-
tion of the work; the only people who cease to benefit are the crea-
tors of the work:
The decalogue says you shall not take away from any man
his property. I do not like to use the harsher term, "Thou
shalt not steal." But the laws of England and America do
take away property from the owner. They select out the
people who create the literature of the land. Always talk
handsomely about the literature of the land. Always say
what a fine, a great monumental thing a great literature is.
In the midst of their enthusiasm they turn around and do
what they can to crush it, discourage it, and put it out of ex-
istence.
unsupported argument that once the term of copyright protection expires for
motion pictures that have been deposited with the Library of Congress, those
works will immediately become freely available to the public. See id. at 17. In
fact, the agreement by which Paramount Pictures, and all other major studios,
entrusted materials to the Library of Congress contractually restricts access to
the physical materials regardless of the term of copyright protection.
89. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24.
90. See Who are the Rowdy, Assertive Babblers that the Copyright Industry
Fears?, available at http://www.nocopyright.org/blabblerspage.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 5, 2002).
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I know that we must have that limit. But forty-two years
is too much of a limit. I do not know why there should be a
limit at all. I am quite unable to guess why there should be
a limit to the possession of the product of a man's labor.
There is no limit to real estate.
As Doctor Hale91 has just suggested, you might just as
well, after you had discovered a coal mine and worked it
twenty-eight years, have the Government step in and take it
away-under what pretext?
The excuse for a limited copyright in the United States is
that an author who has produced a book and has had the
benefit of it... long enough, and therefore the Government
takes the property, which does not belong to it, and gener-
ously gives it to the eighty-eight millions .... But it does
not do anything of the kind. It merely takes the author's
property, merely takes from his children the bread and
profit of that book and gives the publisher double profit.
The publisher and some of his confederates who are in the
conspiracy rear families in affluence, and they continue the
enjoyment of these ill-gotten gains generation after genera-
tion.
92
When the House of Representatives extended the term of protection
in the 1976 Copyright Act it noted that the public does not benefit
from a shorter term, but rather the user groups derive a windfall, as
prices the public pay for a work often remain the same after the work
enters the public domain.91 The concept that the public domain
benefits corporations at the expense of authors is ignored by those
who oppose the policy set by Congress. Whether one agrees with
anti-copyright advocates who argue that copyright is "corporate wel-
fare," benefiting publishers at the expense of individuals, or with
Twain, who argued that it is the public domain which benefits pub-
lishers, the mere existence of the debate shows that the appropriate
line between copyright and the public domain is a difficult policy
decision. As such, it should be made by Congress, not by the courts.
91. Edward Everett Hale (1822-1909), Unitarian minister and author of The
Man Without A Country.
92. Patent Arguments, supra note 2, at 116-17 (statement of Samuel L.
Clemens, author).
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V. MYTH #3: "THE ADDITION OF TWENTY MORE YEARS TO THE
TERM OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES WAS A
BAD POLICY CHOICE BY CONGRESS THAT THE COURTS MUST
REVERSE"
The question of whether Congress made a wise decision in ex-
tending the duration of copyright protection by an additional twenty
years is a worthy topic for debate, and some noted copyright scholars
believe that such an extension was not wise.93 But, somehow, the
myth arose that the courts can and should substitute someone else's
view of the appropriate duration of copyright protection for the dura-
tion established by Congress after public hearings and debate.
This Article will not address the complex issue of what the most
appropriate duration of protection should be. That is a policy ques-
tion that cannot form a basis for a legal challenge to congressional
legislation. This Article will, however, in debunking the myth that
the courts must reverse that congressional determination, seek to es-
tablish that-whether you agree or disagree with the outcome-
Congress did indeed have a rational basis for extending the term of
copyright protection.
A. The CTEA Added Only Twenty Years to the Minimum Term
Required by International Law
Lost in the rhetoric of the anti-copyright advocates is the fact
that the CTEA added only twenty years to the minimum term of
copyright protection required by the Berne Convention.94 That lim-
ited increase-the first increase ever enacted by Congress above the
required international minimum and an increase bringing the United
States to the level of protection already in force throughout Europe-
contradicts the myth that Congress is abusing its authority in deter-
mining the appropriate duration of copyright protection and must be
stopped by the courts.
Congress did not extend the term of copyright protection for 300
years beyond the internationally required minimum; it did not extend
93. As previously noted, Professor Jane C. Ginsburg of Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law stated that term extension was a bad idea, but it is nonethe-
less not unconstitutional. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 695.
94. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 233
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
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it for 100 years. It extended it for twenty years. Hypothetical argu-
ments that an extension of the U.S. term of protection for 100 years
beyond the international minimum would be an abuse of congres-
sional discretion are simply not relevant.
This lack of abuse of congressional discretion is made even
clearer when it is considered that the internationally required mini-
mum term of protection-life plus fifty years-has been the standard
since 1908. 95 A congressional decision to extend the term of copy-
right protection twenty years beyond the international minimum es-
tablished ninety-four years ago is not the type of congressional deci-
sion which--contrary to the cries of the anti-copyright advocates-
can accurately be portrayed as an abuse of discretion requiring judi-
cial intervention.
B. The United States Still Has One of the Shortest Terms of
Copyright Protection
When considering whether the decision by Congress to extend
the term of protection to life of the author plus seventy years was ei-
ther a baseless decision or not for a "limited term," it is important to
keep in mind that the United States still has a shorter term of protec-
tion than many of its key trading partners.
Congress determined that the appropriate term of protection is
the limited term of life of the author plus seventy years. While that
term is, on its face, the mirror of the European standard for the term
of protection, there are three twists to the calculation of that term.
As a result of these twists, the United States actually protects many
works for a shorter duration of protection accorded in other coun-
tries.
1. Calculation of the term of protection
The first twist may result in works being protected for decades
longer in Europe than in the United States under the life-plus-70-
years standard of protection. This difference arises from the fact that
members of the European Union, and most other countries, do not
recognize the work-for-hire doctrine. As a result, they treat the term
of protection as lasting for the life of the last surviving author plus
seventy years. The "authors" of an audiovisual work are defined as
95. The basic term of protection equal to life of the author plus fifty years
was set forth in the Beme Convention. See Berne Convention, supra note 94.
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"the principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the
dialogue, and the composer of music specifically created for use in
the work.",
9 6
If any one of these authors survives for more than twenty-five
years after the date on which the audiovisual production was created,
the term of protection accorded in Europe will be longer than the
term accorded under U.S. law. For example, the European approach
would be anticipated to add more than twenty years of protection be-
yond the U.S. term of protection for a film such as Save The Last
Dance.97 Under U.S. work-for-hire law the film will be protected
until 2096.98 If the last of the authors of the film (as defined by the
E.U. Directive) dies at age seventy-seven, 99 the film will be protected
by copyright until 2118-an additional twenty-two years of protec-
tion. 
100
2. Wartime extensions of the duration of protection
The second twist arises from wartime extensions of copyright
protection in Europe, which can add as much as forty-four years to
the term of copyright protection beyond the life-plus-70 years term.
A number of European countries extended by a period of time
equal to the duration of the two World Wars the term of protection
96. Term Directive, supra note 14, at 9-13. Article 2, section 2 provides:
The term of protection of cinematographic or audiovisual works shall
expire 70 years after the death of the last of the following persons to
survive, whether or not these persons are designated as co-authors:
the principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the
dialogue and the composer of music specifically created for use in the
cinematographic or audiovisual work.
Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
97. SAVE THE LAST DANCE (Paramount Pictures 2001).
98. Save the Last Dance was released in 2001. The term of protection for a
work made for hire, under the CTEA, is ninety-five years from the date of
creation. As a result, the film will be protected until 2096. See Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827 (1998).
99. According to statistics maintained by the National Center for Health
Statistics, the life expectancy for Americans is 76.7 years. See United States
Life Tables, 1998, in 48 NAT. VITAL STAT. REP. 18, 1 (2001).
100. Three of the "authors" of the film (composers of music specifically cre-
ated for use in the work), Snoop Doggy Dogg, Red Man, and Method Man,
were born in 1971. If any one of the three lives seventy-seven years, the sev-
enty-year post-mortem term of protection would commence in 2048 and end in
2118.
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for works created prior to or during those wars. For example, to
cover the First World War, France added six years and 152 days to
the term of protection for all works created prior to December 31,
1920.101 To cover the Second World War, France added eight years
and 120 days for works created prior to January 1, 1948.112 In addi-
tion, a further term of protection of thirty years was added to the
works of authors who were killed in action-including Antoine de
Saint-Exupdry (author of The Little Prince). 103 As a result, an author
who published a work prior to the outbreak of the First World War,
then died in action during either war, will have his works protected
for forty-four years beyond the usual life-plus-70-years term.'
0 4
The E.U. Term Directive took note of these wartime extensions,
providing in the preamble: "Whereas certain Member States have
granted a term longer than 50 years after the death of the author in
order to offset the effects of the world wars on the exploitation of the
authors' works. ,,105 It was generally expected that the extension of
the term of protection from life of the author plus fifty years to life of
the author plus seventy years would subsume the wartime extensions,
but the Directive did not require Member States to abandon their
wartime extensions.
When France enacted its domestic legislation implementing the
Term Directive, it did not repeal the wartime extensions. A French
court has since ruled that copyrights in France are protected for the
life-plus-70-years term plus all applicable wartime extensions, which
can result in a term of protection of the life of the author plus 114
years. 1
06
Example: in 1906 Claude Monet painted Water Lilies, which is
in the collection of the Art Institute of Chicago. That work entered
101. See Loi 3 fevrier 1919, art. 1, C. propr. intell. Art. L. 123-8.
102. See Loi 21 septembre 1951, art. 1, C. propr. intell. Art. L. 123-9.
103. The additional thirty-year extension applies, under C. propr. intell. art.
L. 123-10 (continuing the law of 1951), where the author "died for France"-
referring to the required annotation on the author's death certificate.
104. Similarly, Belgium provided a wartime extension of ten years and Italy
an extension of twelve years.
105. Term Directive, supra note 14, pmbl.
106. See T.G.I. Paris, June 27, 2001. This result is consistent with the provi-
sions of Article 10(1) of the Term Directive, which provides: "Where a term
of protection, which is longer than the corresponding term provided for by this
Directive ... this Directive shall not have the effect of shortening that term of
protection in that Member State." Term Directive, supra note 14, art. 10(1).
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the public domain in the United States in 1981.107 Under a life-plus-
70-years term of protection, Monet's paintings were protected in
France until 1996.1°8 However both of the French wartime exten-
sions apply to Monet's work, with the result that his works will con-
tinue to be protected in France until 201 0-a term of life plus eighty-
four years.'
09
3. Retroactive application of protection to works in the public
domain
The third twist is that, when the term of protection for works
was extended in Europe in compliance with the E.U.'s Term Direc-
tive, works by European authors that fell into the public domain were
restored to copyright protection. The works of an author who had
been deceased for between fifty-one and seventy years, and thus in
the public domain in the U.K., were pulled from the public domain
and restored to copyright protection.
110
Professor Paul Geller provides an example: "Consider hypo-
thetically, the painting Broadway Boogie-Woogie. The Dutch artist
Mondrian completed it in the United States before he died there in
1944. Copyright expired in this painting in the Netherlands at the
end of 1994 when the then-effective Dutch term of life plus [fifty]
107. Under U.S. law, the painting entered the public domain in this country
seventy-five years after the earlier of the dates of its first publication or regis-
tration with the U.S. Copyright Office.
108. Monet died in 1926.
109. This result was recently affirmed by the French appeals court, Tribunal
de Grande Instance de Paris. A.D.A.G.P. v. Editions Hazan, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, 27 juin 2001.
110. Article 10(2) of the Term Directive provides: "The terms of protection
provided for in this Directive shall apply to all works.., which are protected
in at least one Member State.... ." Term Directive, supra note 14, art. 10(2).
Germany had a term of protection of life plus seventy years prior to the Term
Directive, and because the 1958 Treaty of Rome (the founding document of the
European Community) precluded Member States from discriminating against
nationals of other Member States (originally Article 7, now Article 12), Ger-
many had to accord the life-plus-70-years term to authors of other Member
States. For example, if a U.K. work was protected for life plus seventy years
in Germany-even though it was only protected for life plus fifty years in the
United Kingdom. Under Article 10(2) of the Term Directive the work became
entitled to the longer term of protection in all Member States. The E.C. Court
of Justice confirmed this result in 1993. See Joined Cases C-92/92 & C-
326/92, Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1993 C.M.L.R. 773
(1993).
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years lapsed.""' The work was still protected in Germany under the
German term of life plus seventy years. Implementation of the Term
Directive pulled the painting from the public domain and restored
copyright protection in the Netherlands and throughout the rest of
Europe. 112
Congress could have provided for a similar result in the CTEA
by applying the extended term of protection to works already in the
public domain. 13 Yet Congress chose not to. As a result, U.S. copy-
right law provides a lower level of protection for works than the
copyright laws of our European trading partners. When opponents of
the CTEA promote the myth that Congress overreached or broke new
ground in enacting the CTEA, they universally ignore these facts.
C. The Framers Intended the "Limited Term" Provision of the
Copyright Clause to Prevent Replication of the Perpetual Term of
Protection Accorded for Common Law Copyright
It is important to keep in mind that the Founding Fathers drafted
the Copyright Clause against the background of common law copy-
right that then existed in the colonies. Common law copyright
granted perpetual protection.
The Copyright Clause did not extinguish this notion of perpetual
copyright. Similarly, the Copyright Acts of 1790, 1831, 1870, and
1909 did not extinguish the notion. Until January 1, 1976, a work
that was fixed in a tangible form but not published" 4 enjoyed per-
petual copyright protection in this country. Indeed, throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and well into the twentieth
111. Paul Edward Geller, Zombie and Once-Dead Works: Copyright Retro-
activity after the E.C. Term Directive, ENT. & SPORTS LAW, Summer 2002, at
9.
112. See id.
113. Congress did provide for restoration of "lost" copyrights in the Uruguay
Round Act. The Act automatically restores copyright protection for certain
foreign works effective January 1, 1996. Although restoration is automatic,
the copyright owner must file a Notice of Intent to Enforce the Restored Copy-
right with the Copyright Office in order to enforce rights against reliance par-
ties. Works covered by the Act are works of non-U.S. origin which lost copy-
right protection in the United States due to a failure to file a timely renewal
application or failure to include the statutorily mandated copyright notice, pro-
vided that the work is still protected by copyright in its country of origin. See
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
114. "Publication" in this context means distribution of copies to the public.
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century, this perpetual protection for unpublished works embraced
such art forms as music, theater, speech, and phonograph records-
because those works did not involve distribution of copies to the
public." 
5
The "limited term" language of the Copyright Clause indicates
nothing more than the Founding Fathers' intention that Congress
should not replicate the common law system of perpetual copyright.
There is no indication that the Founding Fathers intended to prevent
Congress from enacting a term of protection which endures for a
fixed term of years following the death of the author or that the
Founding Fathers used the words "limited term" when what they
really meant was "short term" (or "very short term"). Taken in its
historical perspective, the "limited term" restriction of the Copyright
Clause prohibits only an unlimited (perpetual) term; it does not man-
date a "short" term of protection. As a result, the authority of courts
to review the duration of copyright, established as a policy matter by
Congress, is limited to the question of whether the term of protection
is finite; the courts have no jurisdiction to second guess the appropri-
ateness of any finite term of protection.
D. Examination of Congressional Rationales Behind Enaction of the
CTEA
The myth is that Congress had absolutely no basis for its deci-
sion to add twenty years to existing terms of copyright protection,
and that Congress merely did the bidding of copyright robber barons.
Even those who disagree with congressional wisdom when it ex-
tended the term of copyright must acknowledge that, contrary to this
myth, Congress had legitimate substantive reasons for adopting term
extension.
Since attacks on the duration of copyright protection extend be-
yond the CTEA to include the extension of the term of copyright pro-
tection in the 1976 Act, and the nine interim extensions which were a
part of that new term of protection, it is worth taking a moment to
consider the congressional rationale for the 1976 term extension.
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act, federal copyright law
measured the term of protection as commencing upon the publication
of the work or its registration with the U.S. Copyright Office,
115. Phonograph records were not considered copies.
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whichever came earlier. A renewal term followed the initial term of
protection. 16 The 1976 Act replaced this system with a single, non-
renewable term of protection that commenced on the date the work
was created (rather than on the date the work was published or regis-
tered with the Copyright Office) and continued for the life of the au-
thor plus a set term of years.
The House Committee Report"17 set forth the following ration-
ales for this dramatic change in the system for determining the dura-
tion of copyright protection:
1. The fifty-six-year term under the 1909 Act was not long
enough to assure an author and his dependants a fair eco-
nomic return, given the substantial increase in life expec-
tancy;
2. The growth in communications media substantially
lengthened the commercial life of a great many works, par-
ticularly serious works which might not initially be recog-
nized by the public;
3. The public does not benefit from a shorter term, but
rather the exploiters of works derive a windfall, as prices that
the public pays for a work often remain the same after the
work enters the public domain;
4. A system based upon life of the author avoids confu-
sion and uncertainty, because the date of death is clearer and
more definite than the date of publication, and it means that
116. The concept of two terms of protection consisting of a fixed number of
years, commencing on the date of the first publication of the work, dates back
to the year 1709 and the English Statute of Anne:
[T]he Author of any Book or Books already composed and not printed
and published or that shall hereafter be composed and his Assignee or
Assignes shall have the sole Liberty of printing and reprinting such
Book and Books for the Term of Fourteen Years to commence from
the Day of the first publishing the same and no longer .... Provided
always That after the Expiration of the said Term of Fourteen Years
the sole Right of printing or disposing of Copies shall return to the
Authors thereof if they are then living for another Term of Fourteen
Years.
Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.).
By the time the U.S. 1909 Copyright Act was enacted, the two terms of
protection had evolved into an initial twenty-eight-year term and a potential
renewal term for a second twenty-eight-year term, thus offering a maximum
term of protection of fifty-six years.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134-35 (1976).
Fall 2002] MYTHOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
all of a given author's works will enter the public domain at
the same time instead of seriatim as under a term based upon
publication;
5. The renewal system, with its highly technical require-
ments, often resulted in inadvertent and unfair loss of copy-
right protection;
6. A statutory term of life plus fifty years is fair recom-
pense for those who, under the 1909 Copyright Act, owned
common law copyrights which prior to the 1909 Act enjoyed
protection in perpetuity; and
7. A majority of the world's countries have a term of life
plus fifty years. To adopt the same term expedited interna-
tional commerce in literary properties and opened the way for
United States membership in the Berne Convention."1
8
These rationales also provide justification for the extension of the
term of protection in the CTEA. But we need not surmise this. The
legislative history of the CTEA is replete with evidence of congres-
sional intent. The primary congressional rationale for the extension
of the duration of copyright protection, as expressed in the legislative
history of the CTEA, was harmonization with international norms.
Some critics of term extension dismiss harmonization as nothing
more than an effort to keep up with the Joneses, as the blind follow-
ing the blind. 19 A more informed view of harmonization sees it as a
movement towards a worldwide agreement on the protection which
should be accorded to copyrights. Such agreement is necessary in
the age of the Internet, where copyright exploitation is no longer con-
tained within the boundaries of any one country. 1
20
118. The United States did indeed finally adhere to the Berne Convention
twelve years later. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(1988)).
119. See, e.g., Gillmor, supra note 23, at IC ("Another peculiar rationale for
the [CTEA] was to make U.S. copyright terms match their European counter-
parts. By that logic, the United States should bring all of its laws in line with
the worst statutes around the world. Heck, they don't have free speech in
China, so we might as well do away with it here.").
120. See CTEA Hearings, supra note 13, at 8, 10 (prepared statement of
Marybeth Peters noting that the importance of international harmonization of
copyright laws is enhanced by the "development of the global information in-
frastructure," which means that copyrighted works now may be transmitted,
virtually instantly, almost anywhere in the world).
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It is readily apparent that harmonization does not require an ex-
act match of laws. This is contrary to the myth created by a group of
law professors who filed an amicus brief in support of the attack on
term extension. 12 According to their myth, the CTEA does not har-
monize U.S. copyright law with European copyright law because
disparities remain between the term of protection for certain classes
of works. Harmonization is, however, not the same as duplication;
harmonization only requires that laws work in harmony together.
Laws that vary by twenty years in the term of protection accorded to
all copyrighted works are not harmonious; laws that vary in their de-
tails can be, and are, harmonious.
The United States is a shamefully late arrival in the international
copyright arena. Since virtually the founding of the nation we have
under-protected copyright owners. 122 The United States was catch-
ing up in 1909, catching up in 1976, and catching up in 1998 with the
CTEA. It took the United States until 1989 to join the international
Berne Convention. 123 The characterization of a Congress run amok
enacting copyright standards invented by United States corporations
without precedent or basis is simply untrue.
The European Union, in extending the term of protection to life
plus seventy years, did not act in a capricious manner. When the
Council of European Communities enacted the Copyright Term Di-
rective, requiring Member States to adopt a copyright term of life
plus seventy years, it reasoned that:
"[T]he minimum term of protection laid down by the Berne
Convention, namely the life of the author and 50 years after
his death, was intended to provide protection for the author
and the first two generations of his descendants; whereas
121. See Intellectual Property Professors Brief, supra note 88, at 16-19.
122. Professor Jane Ginsburg has noted that "for the first 100 years or so of
our existence, we were a pirate nation. We lived happily by copying other na-
tions' literary works, particularly England's. One reason that we did not have
particularly strong copyright laws until relatively late in the game was that we
thought the balance of economics favored piracy over protection. When the
balance shifted... we changed from being a pirate nation to a major copy-
right-producing nation. We then increased the scope of copyright protection,
as well as its duration." Symposium, supra note 6, at 696-97.
123. See generally Berne Convention supra note 94 (international treaty re-
quiring member nations to maintain high levels of protection for artistic
works); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1988)).
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the average lifespan in the Community has grown longer, to
the point where this term is no longer sufficient to cover
two generations .. ,,24
Harmonizing U.S. law with international norms is not just keeping
up with the Joneses. If the United States sends the message that it
does not view copyrights as worthy of the level of protection ac-
corded by international norms, it will be far more difficult to per-
suade other countries that accord even lower levels of protection that
they must comply with international norms. 125 When all is said and
done, disagreement over whether international harmonization is a
proper goal for copyright legislation is nothing more than a dispute
over policy and provides no basis for a legal challenge to such legis-
lation.
VI. MYTH #4: "EXTENSIONS OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR EXISTING WORKS CANNOT POSSIBLY PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS"
In order to perpetuate the myth that an extension of the duration
of protection for existing works does not promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, anti-copyright advocates ask a self-
serving question and then supply the only possible answer. The
question asked is: copyright law promotes the creation of new
works, but once a work is created, how can an extension of the term
of protection promote the creation of a work which already exists?
The answer, of course, is that it cannot. In other words,
"[e]xtensions [of the term of copyright protection] can't be retroac-
tive, because the Constitution gives Congress the right to grant ex-
clusive rights only if those rights create incentives to produce more
speech. Extending these benefits retroactively doesn't serve any pur-
poses the copyright clause was designed for."'
' 26
124. Term Directive, supra note 14, at 9-13.
125. For those who dismiss harmonization as an important goal for Congress
to pursue, it should also be kept in mind that the public domain is already lim-
ited by de facto harmonization: a work which is in the public domain only in
the United States and not in other countries cannot be exploited in any medium
which is distributed outside of the United States.
126. Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/
magazine/8-29/featurestoryl.shtml (quoting Lawrence Lessig, counsel for
plaintiff in Eldred). I would ask Professor Lessig: "Where is the requirement
of 'more' speech found in the Copyright Clause?"
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According to this myth, there is no way in which retroactive ex-
tensions of the term of protection can promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts. 127 As a result, the anti-copyright forces argue
that any extension of protections for existing works is a violation of
the "limited term" wording of the Copyright Clause.1
28
This myth is irrelevant in light of the fact that the wording of the
Copyright Clause is introductory only and does not impose any limits
on congressional power, as discussed above. However, even if the
Founding Fathers' use of those words did limit congressional power,
this myth still suffers from four independently fatal flaws. First, the
Copyright Clause is aimed at promoting the progress of science and
useful arts. As such, an extended term of protection for existing
works promotes the creation of new works. Second, by encouraging
copyright owners to preserve and restore works and to adapt those
works to current consumer expectations, Congress promoted the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts. Third, the progress of science
and useful arts requires international cooperation and coordination.
Fourth, authors rely on the fact that their works will continue to en-
joy appropriate copyright protection after the author's death.
It should also be kept in mind throughout this discussion that if
the myth did indeed have merit, the 1909 Act would also be uncon-
stitutional because federal statutory protection attached to works
upon the earlier of either publication or registration. Thus, the only
works which were accorded copyright protection already existed.
Creation, the coming into existence of the work, was irrelevant. Un-
der this theory, all works protected under the 1909 Act would now be
stripped of copyright protection. A similar result would occur under
the 1976 Act, which accords protection to works which exist but
were not published as of the effective date of the Act. They, too,
would lose their copyright protection, since protection was already
127. Indeed, the test must be the absolute test of"in no way." If there is any
way in which a retroactive extension of the term of copyright protection does
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, the extension is not in vio-
lation of the powers accorded Congress by the Copyright Clause.
128. Petitioners pin their argument on the myth that "a blanket extension of
existing copyrights cannot be a 'limited Time[]' that 'promote[s] the Progress
of Science.' It cannot, because the incentive is being given for work that has
already been produced. Retroactive extensions cannot 'promote' the past. No
matter what we offer Hawthorne or Hemingway or Gershwin, they will not
produce anything more." Petitioners Brief, supra note 22, at 22.
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accorded to already-existing works. As silly as it sounds, this myth
forms the core argument of the anti-copyright advocates.
A. Application of Term Extension to Existing Works Promotes the
Progress in Science and the Arts by Fostering the Creation of New
Works in Lieu of the Mere Re-circulation of Existing Works
Those who argue that retroactive extension of the term of pro-
tection cannot possibly promote the progress of the arts, and that
Congress lacks the authority to extend the scope of protection ac-
corded to the works of deceased authors, ignore the fact that the
promotion of progress in the arts requires the creation of new works.
Progress is better served when new works are created than when ex-
isting works are re-circulated, even when existing works are re-
circulated at a lower cost.
Copyright law promotes the creation of works by according
copyright protection for a limited term; it promotes the spread of
ideas by providing that copyright protection does not extend to ideas;
and it promotes the creation of fresh, original works by providing
that the expression of a protected work cannot be reused. Indeed,
Congress rejected the argument that the public benefits from increas-
ing the number of works in the public domain as "contrary to the real
public purpose for copyright protection...." 
129
Existing works need not be in the public domain in order to
promote the creation of new works. In addition to the fact that ideas
are not protected by copyright law, the law recognizes that the crea-
tion of certain desirable classes of works should be promoted by
permitting the use of portions of protected expression: including
works of criticism, comment (including parody), news reporting,
teaching (allowing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
and research.13
0
Whether individuals or courts agree with the choices made by
Congress, the extension of the term of protection for existing works
clearly promotes the progress of the arts by fostering the creation of
new works and discouraging the recycling of existing works. There-
fore, the enactment of the CTEA-whether wise or shortsighted-
was unequivocally within the powers of Congress.
129. S. REP. No. 102-94, at 6 (1991).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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B. Encouraging Copyright Owners to Preserve and Restore
Copyrighted Works Furthers the Progress of Science and the Arts
Opponents of term extension assert the myth that the CTEA im-
pedes the preservation of motion pictures, 131 when the truth is quite
the opposite. The gaping hole in this myth arises from the express
exemption provided in the Act for preservation of works, which was
discussed in detail earlier in this paper.13  The other hole lies in
common business sense. Few people will invest years of time and
tens of thousands of dollars necessary to create a quality restored or
preserved version of a film absent adequate copyright protection.
There will be little chance of recouping the investment of time and
money if everyone is immediately free to duplicate and distribute the
restored version.
Preservation and restoration includes efforts undertaken by all
Hollywood studios to resurrect damaged films. It also includes ef-
forts to bring older works up to current levels of technological stan-
dards and consumer expectations. For example, Paramount Pictures
recently restored two films from the 1950s: Billy Wilder's Sunset
Boulevard and William Wyler's Roman Holiday. That effort took a
year and a half to complete and was motivated in large part by the
desire to have the best possible versions of the films available for
transfer to digital video disc ("DVD"). The restoration effort ex-
tended to restoring the films at 2000-line resolution (DVD resolution
is 525-line resolution), making them suitable for theatrical release.
Phil Murphy, who headed the restoration effort, noted that:
Both films started life as nitrate films, and the original ni-
trate negatives disintegrated many years ago. So being able
to walk into a movie theater and put a 35mm film on the
projector and show it virtually the same way that they did in
the early '50s is quite an accomplishment.'
33
If those works did not have many years left in their term of
copyright protection, it is unlikely that such time and money would
have been allocated to that effort.
We often hear about the very real problem of "orphan" films-
films for which no one is willing or able to invest the time and
131. See, e.g., Hal Roach Brief, supra note 88, at 13.
132. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
133. HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, July 2002, at 39.
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money to preserve and restore. Cutting short the term of protection
accorded by the CTEA will only increase rather than decrease the
number of orphan films, since all evidence shows that, with only a
handful of exceptions, it is solely copyright owners who spend the
time and money to preserve and restore films.
Some anti-copyright advocates argue that the Copyright Clause
does not give Congress the power to encourage the preservation, res-
toration, and technical updating of works. This idea stems from
copyright opponents' efforts to deny the fact that encouraging "pro-
gress in sciences and the arts" is not limited by text or context to the
encouragement of entirely new works. Investing substantial time and
money in the restoration of films such as Sunset Boulevard and Ro-
man Holiday so that they can be enjoyed by vast new audiences on
DVD is indisputably a direct promotion of the sciences and useful
arts.
C. Application of Term Extension to Existing Works Promotes the
Progress in Science and the Arts by Permitting the United States to
Adhere to International Copyright Treaties and to Protect Its
Copyrights Worldwide
Promoting progress in the arts requires international coopera-
tion. The United States cannot go it alone. The days when the
United States could have a balkanized system of copyright laws that
ignored international standards and a thriving copyright sector faded
in the 1970s, and disappeared in the 1990s with the advent of truly
international distribution of U.S. copyrights.
Without cooperative international efforts to protect and enforce
U.S. copyrights, the interests of U.S. copyright owners will be preju-
diced, producers of audiovisual works-including motion picture and
television productions-will be discouraged from hiring American
creators in favor of hiring European creators, productions may be
moved overseas to take advantage of more favorable copyright laws,
and there will be a significant negative impact on the balance of
trade. 134
International cooperation in the protection and enforcement of
copyrights requires adherence to international norms for copyright
protection-for existing works as well as for future works. Thus, the
134. See discussion infra Part X.
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harmonization of U.S. copyright law with those norms promotes the
progress of the arts. Without harmonization, the progress of U.S.-
created arts will be severely prejudiced. 135
D. Application of Term Extension to Existing Works Promotes the
Progress in Science and the Arts by Encouraging Authors to
Continue Creating New Works with the Knowledge that Existing
Works Will Not be Treated Inferiorly
One of the constant criticisms of Congress's decision to extend
the term of copyright protection for existing works is that Congress
went far beyond what was necessary to provide incentives to authors
to create new works. Critics assert that "it is highly unlikely that a
musical artist or composer would be deterred from performing or
composing by the recognition that his royalties will cease fifty years,
rather than seventy years, after his death."'
136
If the measure for the appropriate term of protection were in-
deed the number of days necessary to induce the creation of new
works, and not one day more, any increase in length would most
likely be inappropriate. But there is nothing in the Constitution or
anywhere else that imposes such a limitation on congressional au-
thority. 37
To the extent, if any, that the words "promote the Progress of
Sciences and the useful Arts" in the Copyright Clause limit congres-
sional power, the correct question is whether the increase in the term
of protection for existing works provides any incentive for the crea-
tion of new works. The answer is clear: increasing the term of pro-
tection for existing works achieves that goal.
135. Petitioners acknowledge that harmonization "might well be an actual or
legitimate" basis for Congress's decision to apply extensions of copyright pro-
tection to existing works, but then they reject that basis with a stroke of the
pen, declaring-without thought or discussion-that such a goal cannot meet
the "progress" requirement of the Copyright Clause. See Petitioners Brief,
supra note 22, at 22.
136. Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Copyright Duration at the Mil-
lennium, 47 J. COPYR. SOC'Y 13, 25 (2000).
137. To recap: "The Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Clause does not state "to create an economic
incentive to produce the next work."
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Legislation that provides an incentive for authors to continue
creating new works is legislation that "promote[s] the progress of
sciences and the useful arts." As discussed above, harmonization of
U.S. copyright law with international norms is an important compo-
nent of effective enforcement of U.S. copyrights abroad. 38 Effective
enforcement of copyrights is indisputably an incentive for the crea-
tion of new works. For example, no motion picture studio would
continue to invest millions of dollars in the creation of new audiovis-
ual works if it did not have the assurance that its copyrights could be
enforced in key territories worldwide. This concern of studios is not
limited to enforcing copyrights future works, but extends to the
copyrights in their library works as well. The revenue generated by
those existing works is the source of the tens of millions of dollars
spent on the creation of each new audiovisual work.
VII. MYTH #5: "CONGRESS LACKS AUTHORITY TO ADD TWENTY
YEARS TO THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION"
The myth that Congress lacks the authority to add twenty years
to the term of copyright protection is based on four unsupportable
arguments: (1) the Copyright Clause requires a finite term of protec-
tion and life plus seventy years is not a finite term; (2) the Copyright
Clause requires an appropriately short duration of protection and the
courts, not Congress, have the final word as to what is appropriate;
(3) the words "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts" in the Copyright Clause are an unequivocal limitation on Con-
gress's ability to extend the duration of copyright protection; and (4)
the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to grant but not to
extend the term of copyright protection.
The weakness of this myth is, perhaps, best demonstrated by the
fact that the petitioners did not use it in their petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court in Eldred.
139
138. See discussion supra Part V.D.
139. The two arguments made to the Court in the petition for certiorari are:
(1) that the circuit court erred in holding that Congress has the power under the
Copyright Clause to extend retrospectively the term of existing copyrights; and
(2) that any extension of the term of copyright protection is subject to chal-
lenge under the First Amendment. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24, at 7-
10.
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The first argument can be quickly discarded because there is no
credible argument that a period of a person's life plus seventy addi-
tional years is not a finite period of time.
The second argument should be discarded just as quickly. As
discussed above, Congress added twenty years to the internationally
required minimum term for copyright protection - a minimum estab-
lished ninety-four years ago, and that extended term is equal to the
term of protection accorded throughout Europe.
The Copyright Clause does not limit congressional authority to
extend copyright protection only "for a limited time coextensive with
the life of the author" or "the life of the author plus one generation of
the author's heirs." When the Council of the European Communities
enacted the Copyright Term Directive harmonizing the duration of
copyright protection in Europe at a life-plus-70-years term, it noted
that the life-plus-50-years term of protection was intended to provide
protection for the author and the first two generations of his descen-
dants. The European Union noted that life expectancy has, over
time, "grown longer, to the point where this term is no longer suffi-
cient to cover two generations."'' 40 Similarly, Congress has the au-
thority to extend the term of copyright to benefit future generations
of authors' heirs.
The criticisms lodged with the courts about Congress's decision
to adopt the European standard of life plus seventy years for copy-
right protection are nothing more than the policy arguments that were
heard and considered by Congress. When the question is asked:
"What author is going to decide not to write another book because
copyright royalties will flow only for 50 years, not 70 years, after her
death?,"' 4 1 the issue raised is one of policy, not one of law. Since a
copyright term of life of the author plus seventy years is, indisputa-
bly, both a finite and a limited term-regardless of whether one
agrees with the choices made by Congress as to where that limit
should be drawn-the claim that the CTEA extended copyright pro-
tection beyond a limited term is without merit.
The third argument holds that the phrase "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.. ." in the Copyright Clause is an
absolute limitation on the powers of Congress when enacting
140. Term Directive, supra note 14, § 5.
141. Stephen R. Barnett & Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright From Now Till
Practically Forever, WASH. POST, July 14, 1995, at A21.
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legislation, and any copyright legislation which does not directly
promote the progress of sciences and the useful arts is unconstitu-
tional.
142
The truth is that the phrase can only be read "in the nature of a
preamble, indicating the purpose of the power," and not as a limita-
tion on its exercise. 143 If the phrase created the strict limitation that
opponents to term extension pretend it does, Congress would not
have the authority to protect any works that are not "useful" arts.
The courts have, however, correctly concluded that, "Congress need
not 'require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the
useful arts...' That being so, we cannot accept... [the] argument
that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a
limit on congressional power."'
144
The fourth argument, that Congress has the power to grant but
not to extend copyright protection, is the unsubstantiated invention of
the Circuit Court's dissenter in Eldred.14 5 According to this myth,
the Copyright Clause grants Congress only the power to secure ex-
clusive rights in copyrights for a limited period: "the means em-
ployed by Congress here are not the securing of the exclusive rights
for a limited period, but rather a different animal altogether: the ex-
tension of exclusivity previously secured. This is not within the
means authorized by the Copyright Clause, and it is not constitu-
tional. 146 In other words, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress
to grant, but not to extend, copyright protection.
142. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
143. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 29, § 1.03[A]; see also Hutchinson
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985):
([T]he phrase 'To promote the progress of science and useful arts...'
[contained in the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution
must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the pur-
pose of the power [granted Congress to pass copyright legislation] but
not in limitation of its exercise .... [A]lthough the promotion of artis-
tic and scientific creativity and the benefits flowing therefrom to the
public are purposes of the Copyright Clause, those purposes do not
limit Congress's power to legislate in the field of copyright.).
144. M.B. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted);
see also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852,
860 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (discussing the constitu-
tionality of the 1909 Act).
145. See 239 F.3d 372, 382 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).
146. Id.
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The District of Columbia Circuit's majority opinion treated this
argument as total nonsense, noting that the dissent failed to identify
anything in text or in history which would suggest that the duration
of the "limited Time" of protection cannot be changed. 147 In addi-
tion, the fallacy of this myth can be traced all the way back to 1790.
The argument that the Copyright Clause must be construed in such a
limiting fashion is inconsistent with congressional interpretations
beginning in 1790, when the Framers of the Constitution were still
members of Congress. The majority decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Eldred noted that:
The position of our dissenting colleague is made all the
more difficult because the First Congress made the Copy-
right Act of 1790 applicable to subsisting copyrights arising
under the copyright laws of the several states. 4 8 The con-
struction of the Constitution "by [those] contemporary with
its formation, many of whom were members of the conven-
tion which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great
weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus es-
tablished have not been disputed [for this long], it is almost
conclusive. "149
The following historical facts provide other examples of the in-
consistency of this argument:
e The Copyright Clause vested Congress with the authority
to protect "writings" (i.e., only books, maps, charts, and pe-
riodicals); 150 yet copyright protection extends to paintings,
sculpture, sheet music, audiovisual works, sound re-
cordings, and computer programs;
147. See id. at 379.
148. See Act of May 31, 1790, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 124-25.
149. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)) (brackets in origi-
nal).
150. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (2000)). The 1790 Act accorded protection only to maps, charts,
and books. If the preamble is to be read as a strict limitation on the powers of
Congress, the 1790 Act and only the 1790 Act was constitutional, and all sub-
sequent copyright acts which extended the scope of protection beyond such
"writings" are unconstitutional and must be struck down by the courts.
300
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e The Copyright Clause grants Congress the right to accord
exclusive rights in copyright, yet the Copyright Acts ad-
dress both exclusive and non-exclusive rights;
9 The Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to ac-
cord copyright protection for "limited Times," not "multiple
limited Times," yet works created prior to 1978 were ac-
corded two separate terms of protection (an initial term and
a renewal term); 151 and
* The Copyright Clause uses the words "by securing for
limited Times" and not "by securing or changing," yet this
does not mean that Congress has the authority to set the
limited time but lacks the authority to ever change the dura-
tion of that limited time (an argument which, if true, would
have limited the term of copyright to the duration estab-
lished in 1790).
Therefore, the myth that the Copyright Clause empowers Con-
gress to grant, but not to extend, copyright protection is contradicted
by the language of the Copyright Clause and by 212 years of copy-
right law.
VIII. MYTH #6: "EXTENSIONS OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION ARE AN AFFRONT TO AND AN IMPINGEMENT ON FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS"
The fallacy of the myth that extensions of the term of copyright
are an affront to, and impingement on, First Amendment rights can
be seen through an examination, first, of the interplay between First
Amendment guarantees and copyright, and second, of the interplay
between extensions of the term of copyright protection and the First
Amendment.
151. Petitioners argue that Congress cannot extend the term of protection for
existing works because, based on the Supreme Court decision in Feist Publ 'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), copyright protection can only
be granted to works which are original. According to petitioners' argument,
existing works are not original and thus cannot be granted "new" protection.
See Petitioners Brief, supra note 22, at 32-33. Petitioners fail to explain why,
if the Court were to adopt this argument, the renewal terms of copyright ac-
corded by the Copyright Acts of 1890, 1909, and 1976 are not invalid on the
same grounds: the grant of a second term of protection for copyrighted works
is equally a grant of new protection for a work which already exists and thus is
not original.
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A. Copyright and the First Amendment
There are two long-recognized reasons why copyright laws do
not impinge upon First Amendment rights. The first is the
idea/expression dichotomy that arises from the fact that copyright
law protects only expression and not ideas or facts. This inherent
limitation of copyright law "'strike[s] a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expres-
sion.""52
The second guarantee of First Amendment rights lies in the fair
use doctrine, which allows the expression itself to be copied when
the purpose of the copying is a use such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research.
Professor Jane Ginsburg suggested a third analysis: First
Amendment guarantees of free speech grant the right to speak origi-
nal speech and to repeat the ideas of others, but it does not create a
constitutional right to repeat a prior speaker's expression without his
consent. 153
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that copyright laws are
the engines of free speech. 154 Anti-copyright advocates, unable to re-
argue the well-settled point that copyright does not impinge on the
First Amendment, are left with a much narrower argument. They
claim that, while copyright protection does not violate First Amend-
ment rights, the addition of twenty years to that protected right does
violate the First Amendment. 1
55
152. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985) (brackets in original); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (copyright laws are not re-
strictions on freedom of speech as copyright protects only forms of expression
and not the ideas expressed).
153. Professor Ginsburg inquires about the nature of the "speech" at issue
here: "What Eric Eldred proposes to do is recirculate other people's speech.
The First Amendment is certainly about the freedom to make your own speech.
Whether it is about the freedom to make other people's speeches again for
them, I have some doubt." Symposium, supra note 6, at 701.
154. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
155. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 22, at 33-47.
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B. Term Extension and the First Amendment
Scholars offer two theories in support of the claim that extend-
ing the term of copyright protection violates the rights of the public.
These are the improper tax theory and the public trust doctrine.
According to Lawrence Lessig, the CTEA infringes individuals'
freedom of speech. He claims that "[t]he extension takes works that
would have entered the public domain and privatizes them improp-
erly; the result is like a tax on freedom of expression. Eldred can't
publicly utter these words now without paying a penalty imposed by
the government."' 56 Stripped of irrelevant asides, the argument is
that copyright laws are a tax on freedom of expression and, as a re-
sult, are unconstitutional intrusions on First Amendment rights.
According to the "public trust doctrine," when a work is created
the public gains an immediate vested interest in that work going into
the public domain at the end of the then-current term of copyright
protection. If Congress subsequently adds additional years to that
term of protection, Congress has improperly deprived the public of
its vested interest. 157 In other words, any time Congress passes legis-
lation that attaches new rights or extends the duration of protection to
existing copyrights, it violates the First Amendment by imposing a
tax on freedom of expression and it deprives the public of vested
property rights.
The unconstitutional-tax argument fails because it applies to all
copyright laws, regardless of the term of protection. Advocates of
these theories cannot explain why a life-plus-70-years term repre-
sents a tax on the freedom of expression but a life-plus-50-years term
does not.
The public trust doctrine similarly fails to provide a logically
consistent basis for attacking the legality of a life-plus-70-years term
of protection. Professor Jane Ginsburg noted that:
156. Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/
magazine/8-29/featurestoryl .shtml (quoting Lessig).
157. For a discussion of the "public trust doctrine," see Richard Epstein, The
Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO. J. 411 (1987) (arguing that the public trust
doctrine should prohibit the transfer of public property to private parties where
there is no "reason to believe that the private owner of the asset can make bet-
ter use of it than the public owner"); see also Richard Epstein, Congress's
Copyright Gateway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19 (arguing that the
CTEA harms ordinary consumers).
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If the public has a vested interest in a work falling into the
public domain on the date expected at the time of the
work's creation, then it follows that every term extension
after 1790 is constitutionally infirm. The Eldred papers do
not offer a limiting principle to help us understand how the
public's interest could have been any less 'vested' in 1831,
1909, every year in the 1960s, and 1994 than it is today.
Why is the [CTEA] term extension more noxious than
every other term extension?
By the same token, one could say that the scope of the
public domain was actually defined in 1790, when Con-
gress protected maps, charts, and books against reproduc-
tion. Congress did not include pictures, music, a derivative
works right, or a public performing right. Sound recordings
were brought within the scope of the Copyright Act only in
1972, and a digital performance right in sound recordings
was enacted only a couple of years ago. Under the theory
that the scope of the public domain was defined in 1790,
every one of those congressional acts constituted an incur-
sion into the public domain .... That would mean, for ex-
ample, that any sound recording created before enactment
of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
of 1995 should not enjoy such a performance right today.'
58
The very same limitations of copyright law which ensure that
copyright does not impinge on First Amendment rights-the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense-apply to exten-
sions of the term of protection in precisely the same manner as they
do to the original term of protection.' 
59
Unable to assert any persuasive argument that a twenty-year in-
crease in the term of copyright infringes in any way on First
Amendment rights, the anti-copyright advocates attempt a diversion-
ary tactic. The petition for a writ of certiorari seizes on the statement
by the circuit court in Eldred that "copyrights are categorically
158. Symposium, supra note 6, at 703-04 (citations omitted).
159. Indeed, the twenty years of the extended term of protection are limited
by the provisions of section 108 of the Copyright Act-limitations which do
not apply to the original term of protection. See discussion of section 108 su-
pra Part IV.E.
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immune from challenges under the First Amendment."' 6 ° The anti-
copyright advocates, in their efforts to find a basis for overturning
the circuit court's ruling, remove the statement from its context and
distort its meaning. 161
What the circuit court actually held is that there is no First
Amendment right to make commercial use of the copyrighted works
of others, and such uses are therefore immune from First Amend-
ment challenge. 162 Contrary to the portrayal of this ruling by anti-
copyright advocates, the court did not rule that all copyright laws are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amend-
ment;163 it ruled only that there is no basis for a claim under the First
Amendment that there is a right to make unauthorized commercial
160. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Dir. 2001) (citing United
Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
161. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24, at 17 ("[u]nder the D.C. Circuit's
rule, there can be no First Amendment challenge to a copyright statute, as any
challenge to a copyright statute is simply a demand for access to particular
copyrighted works"); see also Petitioners Brief, supra note 22, at 33 (exten-
sions of copyright terms are not immune from First Amendment challenge).
162. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
163. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24, at 18. Petitioners, in their brief to
the Supreme Court, make the inflammatory and irrelevant argument that,
based on the circuit court's ruling:
Congress could evade First Amendment review should it amend the
copyright statute to eliminate the idea/expression distinction or to con-
strict the scope of fair use. Nor would Harper & Row immunize from
First Amendment review a copyright act that was content-based sim-
ply because it reached expression only. (If France, for example,
adopted a statute banning copyright for 'hate speech,' and Congress
sought to 'harmonize' with that rule, Harper & Row would not pre-
clude First Amendment review.
Petitioners Brief supra note 22, at 35. The circuit court merely ruled that peti-
tioners had failed to present any argument as to why an extension of the term
of an existing right, without alteration of any kind of that right, should not be
immune from First Amendment attack based on decades of prior consistent
case law. The two examples used in petitioners' brief fail again to answer the
question asked by the circuit court. A law eliminating the idea/expression dis-
tinction or constricting the scope of fair use would alter the very basis for the
court's finding that copyright law does not conflict with First Amendment
rights and would of course be open to challenge; a law banning hate speech
would not be a copyright law, but in any event such a law would not be limited
to an extension unchanged of existing rights, rather it would be a new limita-
tion on those rights and thus subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
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use of copyrighted works. That narrow ruling is entirely consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.' 
64
The plaintiffs did not contest that statement. Instead, they ar-
gued that it should not apply to their challenge since they are contest-
ing "'the constitutionality of the statute granting a [copy]right in the
first instance."" 65 The court rightly rejected this statement as wholly
illusory.
The CTEA does not extend copyright protection to a new class
of works, nor does it expand the scope of rights protected by copy-
right. The Act simply takes the existing scope of rights for the exist-
ing class of works and extends it, unmodified, for an additional
twenty years. The court quite rightly concluded that a challenge to
the CTEA on the grounds that it creates some new form of copyright
interest is immune from a First Amendment claim since no such
rights are created, and the constitutionality of the existing rights is
well established.
While not all copyright laws are immune from First Amendment
challenge-and the circuit court did not hold that they would be-
the anti-copyright advocates failed to offer any credible theory under
which a twenty-year extension of already-existing rights should trig-
ger unique and unprecedented scrutiny under the First Amendment.
IX. MYTH #7: "THE MYTH OF THE HOLY INTERNET: THE ARRIVAL
OF THE INTERNET CHANGES EVERYTHING"
The Myth of the Holy Internet holds that, in light of the arrival
of Internet distribution of copyrighted works, the courts must over-
turn the judgment of Congress as to the appropriate duration of copy-
right protection.' 66 One of the amicus briefs filed in support of the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Eldred argues:
The Eldred decision comes at a critical time for our culture
and its artifacts. For the second time in history the collec-
tion of all recorded information is within our grasp. [The
first being the Greek library of legend at Alexandria.]
164. See Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. National Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
165. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 376.
166. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24, at 9 ("just at the time that the
Internet is enabling a much broader range of individuals to draw upon and de-
velop this creative work 'without restraint'.., extensions of copyright law are
closing off this medium to a broad swath of our common culture.").
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Digital technology allows us the opportunity to build a
'universal' library that dwarfs the collections of the Alex-
andria Library and even our modem Library of Congress. 1
67
These arguments are, however, nothing more than policy argu-
ments. They provide no basis for a court to overturn the congres-
sional judgment that the benefits of twenty years of additional
protection for copyrighted works, with its promotion of the creation
of original works and increase in trade balances, outweigh the
disadvantages of waiting twenty years for the hypothetical benefit of
royalty-free access to those works.'
68
Professor Arthur Miller noted the fallacy of the myths that copy-
right law stifles the development of the Internet and that works must
be moved into the public domain at a more expeditious rate due to
the Internet:
I wish I were alive at Antietam during the Civil War to
watch Matthew Brady taking photographs and listen to the
nineteenth-century Eldreds say, "My God, my God, the sky
is falling. Copyright will never be the same. Now every
human being with a Kodak Brownie can take a photograph
and it will be copyrighted and subjected to governmental
regulation, and it will eviscerate our freedom." Now there
was nobody at Antietam as smart as the people making the
arguments in the Eldred case today. If there were, that ar-
gument would have been made about the photograph, it
would have been made about radio, it would have been
made about the motion picture. It would have been made
about the phonograph record. It would have been made
about television. It would have been made about the com-
puter. And today, of course, it is made about the Inter-
net. 
169
If the arrival of the Internet has any impact on an analysis of the
appropriate term of copyright protection, it is to support the decision
of Congress to adopt the CTEA. The impact of the Internet on
167. Internet Archive Brief, supra note 21, at 3.
168. These arguments also ignore the carve-out from the extended term of
protection that Congress granted to libraries and archives. See discussion su-
pra Part IV.E. ("Congress directly addressed the concerns of libraries and ar-
chives in the CTEA, providing for them with a specific exemption").
169. Symposium, supra note 6, at 691-92.
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copyrights supports the wisdom behind the United States joining the
Europe in protecting copyrights for a term of life of the author plus
seventy years.
The Internet has had three significant impacts on copyrights.
First, it has made piracy user-friendly and has globalized the
distribution of content to an extent not dreamed of by even the most
ambitious multinational corporation. The advent of user-friendly
piracy has, almost overnight, resulted in a world in which a song or
other copyrighted work can be stolen with the click of a mouse and
instantly duplicated to third parties. Indeed, piracy via the Internet
has become so easy and so widespread that many people think of it
as "sharing" instead of "stealing." The second impact has been the
globalization of distribution, which renders international cooperation
a mandatory component of copyright protection and enforcement.
The third impact is the increased opportunity for individuals to be-
come authors of distributed works.
The first impact provides a further justification for lengthening
the term of copyright protection. With online infringement rampant
and the losses to copyright owners from online infringement out-
stripping all revenues from Internet exploitation, the extension of the
term of copyright protection provides a small measure of compensa-
tion to copyright owners for the losses that result from the Internet.'
70
The second impact further demonstrates the need for interna-
tional harmonization of copyright laws. Copyrights created and
owned by U.S. citizens can, in the world of Internet infringement, be
effectively protected only through international cooperation-
including effective enforcement of laws in countries that are sources
of pirated materials. As noted above, if the United States sends the
message that it does not view copyrights as worthy of the level of
protection accorded by international norms, it will be far more diffi-
cult to persuade other countries that provide unacceptably low levels
of protection that they must comply with international norms (norms
which provide enormous benefits to the United States).
170. Online infringements are not limited to the Napster model of file swap-
ping. During the first six months of 2001, the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) identified 8,716 online auctions offering illicit sound re-
cordings for sale. This number represented an increase of 418% from the
number of illicit auctions during the same period of the year 2000.
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The third impact is the increased opportunity created by the
Internet for individual authors to distribute their works. This facilita-
tion of distribution for an ever-growing number of works supports
the congressional policy of increasing, rather than decreasing, the
protection accorded to copyrights in the age of the Internet.
In response to the widespread distribution of works via the
Internet, Congress chose a policy not of abandoning or weakening
the engine of creation provided by copyrights, but a policy of
strengthening that engine to ensure that more works of higher quality
and originality will be made available for Internet distribution.
Whether one agrees with the pro-copyright arguments or with the
anti-copyright arguments, it is indisputable that Congress had a ra-
tional basis for choosing the copyright polices represented by the
CTEA. Those policies will result in an increase in the quality of
works made available for distribution on the Internet.
X. MYTH #8: "THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES IS A MATTER OF U.S. LAW AND HAS No
INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS"
The question of whether Congress had the necessary constitu-
tional authority to enact the CTEA is a question of international law
as well as U.S. law, contrary to portrayals of this debate as an issue
only of U.S. law. International law has a bearing on the debate be-
cause Congress correctly considered the international advantages of
term extension when weighing the merits of extending the term of
protection versus the merits of increasing the speed with which
works enter the public domain.
As discussed above, the goal of harmonization of U.S. law with
international norms for copyright law was a major factor in the deci-
sion by Congress to extend the term of copyright protection.' 7 ' If the
United States steps back from compliance with international norms
for the protection of copyrights, it would no longer be in a position to
chastise or threaten economical sanctions on other countries that fail
to comply with international norms-particularly in the realm of pi-
racy.
Equally important as the policy aspect of the United States con-
tinuing to be in compliance with international norms are the
171. See discussion supra Part V.D.
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economic aspects of this issue. Intellectual property is one of the
largest export sectors for the United States, with the European Union
forming one of our most important markets. At the time Congress
was considering the CTEA, works such as motion pictures, television
programs, and home video provided a surplus balance of trade of
more than $4 billion. 7 2 The continuation of the surplus balance of
trade, which would be threatened by a judicial repeal of the CTEA,
was certainly a valid factor for Congress to consider when weighing
where it should draw the line between copyright protection and the
public domain. 1
73
The first threat to the continued growth of this surplus, were the
Court to strike down the CTEA, would result from what is known as
the "law of the shorter term." Pursuant to the European Union's
Copyright Term Directive, all Member States of the European Union
must refuse to accord protection to works by non-E.U. authors fol-
lowing the expiration of protection in the work's country of origin.' 74
172. See CTEA Hearings, supra note 13, at 42 (statement of Jack Valenti,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica).
173. Promotion of trade in U.S. intellectual property is a clear motivating
factor for Congress. Congressman Howard Coble, Chair of the House Sub-
committee on Courts and Intellectual Property, has noted that:
Congress has enacted [copyright] laws since 1790, resulting in the de-
velopment of American intellectual property that is the envy of the
world. It is one of the top US exports, generates billions of dollars in
revenue, creates jobs, and enriches the lives of the American people
and the world.
State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (2000) (statement of Rep. Howard Coble,
Chairman, Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/cob10727.htm.
174. This result is mandated by the E.U. Copyright Directive. Section 23 of
the Directive provides that:
[W]here a rightholder who is not a Community national qualifies for
protection under an international agreement [such as the Berne Con-
vention] the term of protection of related rights should be the same as
that laid down in this Directive, except that is should not exceed that
fixed in the country of which the rightholder is a national.
Term Directive, supra note 14, at sec. 23. Exceptions to this obligation are
accorded to Member States that have pre-existing international obligations
(i.e., bilateral agreements) which mandate longer terms of protection. See id.
sec. 24. However, no new agreements of this type may be concluded. See id.
sec. 26.
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In other words, even though the E.U. has a term of protection of life
plus seventy years, if the CTEA is repealed the European Union will
protect U.S. works for only a term of life plus fifty years, twenty
years less than the term of protection accorded to European works.
As a result, works by U.S. writers, painters, sculptors, composers,
recording artists, and other authors would no longer receive royalties
from the exploitation of their works in Europe during that twenty-
year period.
The second international economic threat will arise if the courts
strike down all extensions of copyright protection for existing works.
Such a result would eliminate protections for certain sound re-
cordings and the digital performance right. Absent those rights, it
will be difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. copyright owners and tal-
ent guilds to collect their share of equitable remuneration tariffs
(such as blank tape levies), since our ability to collect is dependant
on having reciprocal legal arrangements.
The third international threat lies in the risk that a repeal of the
term extension will hamper the anti-piracy efforts of the U.S. gov-
ernment around the world. If the United States will not bring its laws
into alignment with international norms, it will be more difficult to
persuade countries which are the source of pirated material that they
should bring their laws up to the level of international norms.
Finally, the fourth economic threat lies in the inevitable impact
of works by European authors having a longer term of protection
than works by U.S. authors. Jobs which otherwise would have gone
to Americans will go to Europeans. If a U.S. motion picture studio
can gain an additional twenty years of copyright protection for its
works in virtually all territories outside the United States merely by
hiring a British director instead of an American director, or a French
composer instead of a U.S. composer, the studios will do exactly
that.
175
Although this Article focuses on the myths cited in efforts to
persuade the courts to overturn the CTEA, it should be noted that
Professor Lessig's proposal that the appropriate term of copyright
protection is five years, with the possibility of five-year extensions if
175. The E.U. Term Directive requires that duration of protection for cine-
matogaphic and audiovisual works be measured by the nationality of the direc-
tor, screenwriter(s), and composer of the music, rather than by the country in
which the work was created. See id. art. 2(2).
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certain formalities are complied with, 176 would result in the expul-
sion of the United States from membership in the Berne Union
(which requires protection of not less than a life-plus-50-years term
or the equivalent with formalities permitted). 177 Any benefits that
might spring from such a radical truncation of copyright protection,
if indeed there would be any, pale in comparison to the injury that
would be done to U.S. copyrights beyond the borders of the fifty
states. 78
XI. MYTH #9: "JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
EXTENSIONS OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION WOULD NOT
BE A BIG DEAL"
The implication behind the arguments in favor of a judicial an-
nulment of the CTEA is that it would be no big deal; it would merely
turn back the clock to the way things were prior to the effective date
of the Act. The myth ignores the fact that, were the courts to adopt
either one of the main arguments of the anti-copyright advocates, the
implications for all of copyright law would be enormous. The argu-
ments used to attack Congress's power to enact the CTEA are not
limited in application to that Act, they are also inconsistent with over
200 years of copyright legislation. Furthermore, the anti-copyright
advocates offer no limiting principles or explanations that would
contain their theories to attacks merely on the twenty-year extension
created by the CTEA.
The attack on the extension of the term of copyright protection
for already-existing works is not limited to the extensions contained
in the CTEA; it applies to all such extensions ever enacted by
176. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 251-52 (2001).
177. Beme Convention, Article 7 sets the term of protection at life of the
author plus fifty years; Article 5 indicates that:
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent
of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the
country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention, supra note 94 at 4-7 (1986).
178. One immediate impact would be that other countries would no longer
be obligated to accord any copyright protection for works of U.S. origin unless
obligated to do so by a bilateral or other agreement.
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Congress. 179 The petitioners offer no satisfactory explanation of how
the Supreme Court can accept the argument that the CTEA is uncon-
stitutional because it extends the duration of protection of existing
works, without also having to strike down all prior laws that ex-
tended the duration of protection for existing works. Those laws
stretch back to the first Copyright Act of 1790-which extended pro-
tection to already-existing works, not merely to works created after
1790.
Gone, under these theories of attack, would be the extension of
protection for existing works in the 1976 Act and the interim exten-
sions that led up to the passage of that Act. Gone would be the
statutory protection for existing unpublished works. Gone along
with them would be U.S. membership in the Berne Union-since the
United States would no longer comply with Berne Convention's
minimum requirements for the protection of copyrights.
Evaporating with these rights would be the value of copyrights
upon which parties relied when investing in the production, acquisi-
tion, and preservation of works. Also evaporating would be em-
ployment opportunities for U.S. creators, as production entities
179. According to Lawrence Lessig, "[e]xtensions [of the term of copyright
protection] can't be retroactive, because the Constitution gives Congress the
right to grant exclusive rights only if those rights create incentives to produce
more speech. Extending these benefits retroactively doesn't serve any purposes
the copyright clause was designed for." Fonda, supra note 24, available at
http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-29/featurestoryl .shtml.
180. Petitioners are aware that their argument that any extension of the term
of copyright protection is unconstitutional would require the Court to strike
down the 1831, 1909, and 1976 copyright acts. See Petitioners Brief supra
note 22, at 30. Having identified the problem, in an effort to provide a delimi-
tating line for the Court to follow, petitioners suggest one baseball argument
and one internally inconsistent argument. The baseball argument is: "Whether
or not two extensions in 150 years are excusable, the eleventh in forty years
must be held to have crossed the line." Id. Sort of a three-strike rule: Con-
gress can violate the Constitution by twice applying extended copyright terms
of existing works but after that they must be stopped. The inconsistent argu-
ment is that the retroactive extensions in the 1831 and 1909 Acts required au-
thors to take affirmative steps by filing renewal applications and paying a fee.
See id. at n.13. Leaving aside the fact that this argument does not provide a
safe harbor for the extensions granted by the 1976 Act, petitioners' opposition
to extension of protection for existing works lies in the myth-based argument
that such extension provide no "progress" since the works already exist; how
then does a registration and fee-payment obligation suddenly create "pro-
gress"? See id.
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switch to employing European authors (including directors and com-
posers for audiovisual works) in order to qualify their works for the
longer European term of protection. Balance of trade advantages
would fade as foreign works enjoyed protection for twenty years
longer than U.S. works. The United States would retreat to the posi-
tion of being a copyright rogue nation, denying its creators the pro-
tections afforded by virtually all other developed countries.
It is incumbent upon those who advocate these arguments to explain
why their theories are not inconsistent with over 200 years of copy-
right law. To date they have failed to do so. Similarly, those who
argue that the term of protection of life plus seventy years is not a
"limited term," as required by the Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion, offer no explanation why life plus fifty years is a limited term
but life plus seventy years is an unlimited term.
Two arguments have been offered in support of the claim that
life plus seventy years is not a limited term: (i) the eleven extensions
by Congress over the past forty years of the term of copyright protec-
tion prove that the term of protection is not limited; and (ii) relative
to the 1790 term of copyright, which was twenty-eight years, the cur-
rent term is not sufficiently short (i.e., limited).
The first argument is discredited by the following facts: Con-
gress changed the approach to copyright duration only twice, not
eleven times, during the past forty years; there is no express or im-
plied constitutional limitation on how often Congress can adjust the
term of protection; and regardless of the number of changes in the
duration of protection the current duration remains a finite term.
Petitioners, in their petition for a writ of certiorari, argue that the
term of copyright protection is not a limited term as a result of con-
gressional increases over the years. 181 Yet they fail to offer any ex-
planation why the CTEA crossed the constitutionality line but the
1976 Copyright Act and the 1996 Uruguay Round Act did not cross
that line. If the current term is not limited because it is significantly
longer than the 1790 term of twenty-eight years, no guidance is of-
fered why the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act were constitutional but the
CTEA is unconstitutional.
A decision by the Supreme Court to strike down the CTEA, but
not the 1909 or 1976 Acts, under petitioners' First Amendment
181. See Petition for Writ, supra note 24, at 8-9.
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theory would be arbitrary and capricious. But if petitioners are sug-
gesting that the Court should go further and strike down aspects of
the term of protection set by the 1976 Act, the United States will no
longer be in compliance with its international obligations, it will be
excluded from membership and participation in the Berne Union, and
the United States will be reduced to the status of a rogue copyright
nation. Advocates of the First Amendment challenge offer no expla-
nation as to how this result can be avoided.
Finally, the anti-copyright advocates fail to explain how the Su-
preme Court could strike down the CTEA on First Amendment
grounds without having to strike down every copyright act since
1790 which extended the term of copyright protection for existing
works or which added new protections for existing works. And since
those statutes were the results of balanced public policy decisions on
the part of Congress-such as the 1976 Act which added nineteen
years of protection to existing works while simultaneously decreas-
ing the term of protection for all unpublished works-the advocates
of this theory failed to explain why it would be equitable for the
courts to exercise a line-item veto, cherry picking the parts of the
copyright acts which they would have written differently.
The implications of the courts striking down every copyright act
since 1790 are self evident. Even if the Supreme Court limited its
decision to a line-item veto to the extension of protections for exist-
ing works, the effect would be as discussed above: The United
States would be renouncing its international obligations, retreating
into a nineteenth-century view of copyright protection, and turning
its back on the global nature of copyright exploitation. Instead of
promoting the myth that the challenge to the CTEA is no big deal, it
would be more productive if the advocates of that myth offered satis-
factory explanations of how their theories can be limited to that Act
and why those theories are not inconsistent with copyright law dating
back to 1790.
XII. MYTH #10: "THE CTEA WAS THE WORST KIND OF SPECIAL-
INTEREST LEGISLATION, ENGINEERED BY DISNEY TO SATISFY ITS
INSATIABLE CORPORATE GREED"
The "Mouse" did it! The evil corporate Mouse engineered this
profit-mongering special interest legislation and the Mouse must be
stopped! This myth appears to be an amalgamation of five
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:253
sub-myths: public domain good-corporations bad-Disney evil;
Disney was about to lose all rights to Mickey Mouse and would stop
at nothing to get the term of protection extended; the CTEA was
snuck through Congress without proper debate; Disney improperly
lobbied Congress to obtain the term extension; and the CTEA was
special-interest legislation that only Disney cared about.
A. Sub-myth A: "Public Domain Good, Corporations Evil, Disney
Totally Evil"
This first sub-myth has a nostalgic twinge of Marxism: the pub-
lic domain is good, corporations are bad, and Disney is evil.1 2 Dif-
fering views about the appropriate duration of copyright protection
are longstanding and fully understandable; disagreement about the
constitutionality of the CTEA, while lacking in merit, can be well
intended; but the vitriolic nature of the public attacks on Disney for
its prominent support of the CTEA are somewhat of a mystery.1
83
If we reject the possible explanation that such attacks are linked
to unhappy childhoods, the remaining explanation appears to be an
anti-capitalist view that Disney should be taken to task for advocat-
ing a position which benefits it shareholders. Determination of the
appropriate term of copyright protection is a balancing act, and Dis-
ney's advocacy of a lengthened term of protection is no more inap-
propriate than is advocacy by others in favor of retaining the life-
plus-50-years term.
182. Anyone who believes that Marxist thinking is a thing of the past has not
studied the positions of the pro-public domain/anti-copyright advocates who
advocate public ownership over private property. They favor taking from the
capitalists [the copyright owners] the means of production [copyrights] and
transferring it to the workers [users of works]. They also portray the debate
over copyright term as a class struggle between copyright owners (capitalists)
and the public users (workers) and object to the fact that the difference be-
tween what users would (hypothetically) pay for a public domain work versus
for a copyrighted work is appropriated by the capitalist copyright owner. Fur-
thermore, they depict the extension of the term of copyright protection as in-
creasing the immiseration of the proletariat (the users), who demand revolution
(courts substituting their view of the appropriate duration of protection for the
views of Congress), and who long for a classless society in which the state
(copyright) will wither away. Ah, nostalgia.
183. For example, a website dedicated to opposing copyright term extension
encourages support from "anyone who does not like Disney on principle." The
No Copyright Party, at http://www.nocopyright.org/babblerspage.htm (last
visited Aug. 1, 2002).
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More importantly, regardless of one's view of corporations and
media conglomerates, those views are irrelevant to a debate over the
appropriate term of protection for copyright-protection which ap-
plies equally to writers, playwrights, poets, composers, musicians,
painters, sculptors, and other individual creators of copyrights.
B. Sub-myth B: "Disney was About to Lose All Rights to Mickey
Mouse and Would Stop at Nothing to Get an Extension of the Term
of Copyright Protection"
According to this myth, Disney was on the verge of losing all
rights to Mickey Mouse and the CTEA was special-interest legisla-
tion aimed solely at preserving Disney's financial bottom line. Dis-
ney was not, in fact, ever at risk of losing all of its rights to Mickey
Mouse, which is a trademarked character. 184 It is only the early car-
toons featuring Mickey that were on the cusp of falling into the pub-
lic domain. How, exactly, would the world be a better place if
Steamboat Willie enters the public domain, not in 2003, but instead
twenty years later? 185 Is there a huge market anxiously awaiting the
184. Disney holds federal trademark registrations that, unlike copyright, can
confer perpetual protection for classes of goods, including motion pictures,
cartoon strips, songs, books and newspapers, paper goods and other printed
matter, clocks and watches, entertainment services, hair shampoo, lip gloss,
bubble bath, skin soap, sunglasses, decorative refrigerator magnets, jewelry,
photograph albums, address books, appointment books, paper party bags, ball
point pens, binders, paper gift wrap bows, paper cake decorations, calendars,
gift cards, greeting cards, pen and pencil cases, decorative paper centerpieces,
paper table cloths, paper party decorations, diaries, gift wrapping paper, pen-
cils, stationery, athletic bags, baby backpacks, backpacks, book bags, duffel
bags, gym bags, tote bags, coin purses, fanny packs, knapsacks, waist packs,
umbrellas, wallets, decorative non-metal boxes, beverage glassware, bowls,
lunch boxes, hair brushes, hair combs, cake molds, wind chimes, decorative
plates, cookie jars, mugs, paper cups, paper plates, soap dishes, vacuum bot-
tles, bed sheets, pillow cases, comforters, curtains, dust ruffles, towels, bathing
suits, robes, beachwear, underwear, sweaters, dresses, infant wear, jackets,
pajamas, pants, sweat pants, sweatshirts, shirts, shorts, sleepers, t-shirts, tank
tops and vests, Christmas tree ornaments, rubber balls, plush toys, action skill
games, bath toys, board games, toy building blocks, dolls, children's play cos-
metics, electric action toys, jigsaw puzzles, kites, music box toys, inflatable
pool toys, and children's multiple activity toys.
185. Steamboat Willie was the first cartoon released with sound. In its initial
theatrical release it played ahead of the feature film Gang War, a crime drama
starring Mabel Albertson. While the feature film was quickly forgotten, the
impact of an animated cartoon with synchronized sound-during the cartoon
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royalty-free distribution of a 1928 black-and-white cartoon over the
Internet?
8 6
Even had Steamboat Willie entered the public domain, it is im-
portant to note that the Mickey we know today has notable differ-
ences from the Mickey of 1928. Over the intervening years, Mickey
gained distinctive colors, put on weight, gained eyeballs and eye-
lashes, acquired white gloves and an opposable thumb, and learned
to eak (originally he could only whistle and play music),
Samong other changes. At left
- is Mickey as he appeared in
Steamboat Willie in 1928; at
right is the updated Mickey as
he appears today. 187 Had the
original Mickey entered the public domain in 2003, the thoroughly
modem Mickey would still have continued to enjoy copyright
protection for many years to come, and the trademark protections
would have continued in perpetuity.
According to one published report, Disney's consumer products
division and theme parks brought in $8 billion in 1998 through the
use of Mickey Mouse. 188 Since Disney would not have lost the right
to use Mickey Mouse, would not have lost any rights in the modem
Mickey Mouse, and would not have lost any of its trademark rights
to control the commercial use Mickey Mouse, it is difficult to see
how the entry of Steamboat Willie into the public domain would
have had any impact on those financial figures.
Mickey made music by squeezing barnyard animals until they mooed, brayed,
or squawked-was revolutionary.
186. One of the organizations raising money to support the Sunreme Cout
challenge to copyright extension is using the rallying cry: 1-FREE MICKEY
The image of a poor mouse, imprisoned by an evil corporation, pining to be set
free, is amusing, but is that really a basis for a constitutional challenge to con-
gressional legislation? See Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft, at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
187. The modem Mickey has red pants with white buttons, bright yellow
shoes, white gloves, and a flesh colored face. The Mickey who appeared in
Steamboat Willie was, of course, black and white.
188. See Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/
globe/magazine/8-29/featurestoryl .shtml (quoting a report from the New York
investment bank Salomon Smith Barney).
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C. Sub-myth C." "The CTEA was Snuck Through Congress Without
Debate and Without Legislative History"
The myth has been repeated, mantra-like, that the CTEA was a
work of special-interest lobbying which sailed through Congress
with no opportunity for public debate. Eric Eldred,189 for one, told
the Boston Globe that the CTEA was slipped through when no one
would notice, without debate.
190
That assertion is simply not true. At the congressional hearings
on the issue of copyright term extension held on September 20, 1995,
Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks, and Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian of Congress for Copyright Ser-
vices, testified on behalf of the Administration.' 91
The Committee also heard testimony from Jack Valenti, presi-
dent and chief executive officer of the Motion Picture Association of
America; Alan Menken, composer, lyricist, and representative of
AmSong; Patrick Alger, president of Nashville Songwriters Associa-
tion; and Professor Peter A. Jaszi, American University, Washington
College of Law. In addition, written statements were received from
Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, the National Music Publishing Association
Inc., the Songwriters Guild of America, the Graphic Artists Guild,
the National Writers Union, the Coalition of Creators and Copyright
Owners, Author Services Inc., the Midwest Travel Writers Associa-
tion, Donaldson Publishing Co., the American Library Association,
the American Film Heritage Association, the Society for Cinema
Studies, Lawrence Technology, Bob Dylan Jr., Don Henley, Carlos
Santana, Stephen Sondheim, Mike Stoller, E. Randol Schoenberg,
Ginny Mancini, Lisa M. Brownlee, Professor William Patry, and
Professor Dennis Karjala writing on behalf of forty-five intellectual
property law professors.
189. A re-publisher of public domain books and the named plaintiff in the
court challenge to the constitutionality of CTEA.
190. Fonda, supra note 24, available at http://www.boston.com/
globe/magazine/8-29/featurestory 1 .shtml.
191. See generally CTEA Hearings, supra note 13 (testimony before Senate
Judiciary Committee).
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D. Sub-myth D: "Disney Improperly Lobbied Congress to Obtain
Passage of the CTEA"
It is difficult to understand the sentiment that there is something
inherently wrong about Disney lobbying Congress for legislation that
benefits both Disney and its shareholders. The press quoted, at
length, the amounts Disney and other entertainment industries con-
tributed to Congress, without any effort to differentiate between con-
tributions typical of any corporations with significant legislative con-
cerns (ranging from trade policy to regulation of broadcast opera-
tions) and lobbying specifically directed at this particular piece of
legislation. 192 Imagine the outrage of shareholders if media corpora-
tions did not make an effort to have their views heard on the wide
range of legislation which has an enormous impact on their day-to-
day operations.
What is particularly unclear is why those who excoriate Disney
for lobbying Congress feel that it is acceptable for themselves to
lobby the courts with briefs filled with unsubstantiated myths.
E. Sub-myth E: "The CTEA was Special-Interest Legislation that
Only Disney Cared About"
This myth overlooks that fact is that a wide coalition of copy-
right interests supported the CTEA, not just Disney. In addition to
Disney, major vocal supporters of the Act included the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America, the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers, the Rodgers and Hammerstein Organiza-
tion, the George Gershwin estate, and others.
XIII. CONCLUSION
I conclude with a plea to those who oppose the current duration
of copyright protection to argue from a position of intellectual hon-
esty. Views can legitimately differ about the appropriate term of
protection. But for there to be a productive and useful debate myths
must be abandoned and the following facts acknowledged:
192. One published report indicated that "media companies and their politi-
cal action committees contributed more than $6.5 million to members of Con-
gress during the 1997-98 election cycle." See Fonda, supra note 24, available
at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-29/featurestory l .shtml.
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e Congress has rethought the appropriate term of copyright
protection twice, not eleven times in the past forty years;
e In the same era in which Congress extended the term of
protection, it removed perpetual protection for unpublished
works and for sound recordings, with the result that those
classes of works will now, for the first time, enter the public
domain;
* At the same time Congress extended the term of copy-
right for an additional twenty years it created a broad ex-
emption to copyright holders' exclusive rights during those
additional years for the benefit of libraries and archives;
9 The CTEA extended the term of copyright protection for
just twenty years beyond the internationally required mini-
mum term of copyright protection which was established
ninety-four years ago, and that extended term is equal to or
shorter than the duration of protection already in effect
across Europe;
* Congress can promote the progress of science and the
useful arts by extending the term of copyright for existing
works because such an extension promotes the creation of
fresh works where otherwise existing works might merely
have been recycled, and because harmonization and com-
pliance with international norms promotes domestic crea-
tion of new works and enhances the ability of U.S. creators
to enforce their rights outside of the United States;
* The limitation of copyright protection to expression and
not ideas, coupled with the ever-expanding doctrine of fair
use ensures that copyright protection for works-regardless
of the term of protection--does not conflict with the man-
dates of the First Amendment, regardless of which level of
scrutiny is applied to the analysis;
* Finally, disagreement--even vehement disagreement-
with the congressional balancing of competing interests
when determining the appropriate term of copyright protec-
tion does not empower a court to substitute its judgment for
congressional judgment.
Only when the debate over the appropriate term of copyright protec-
tion is based on a discussion of all of the relevant facts, rather than
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on baseless myths or selective and skewed presentations of facts, can
a meaningful dialogue ensue.
